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Article
Invisible Error
CASSANDRA BURKE ROBERTSON
When trial becomes a luxury, retrial can start to look downright decadent. Scholars
have documented the “vanishing trial” in recent decades, exploring the various causes
and effects of declining trial rates. Retrial, if mentioned at all, is portrayed as a relatively
inefficient vehicle for error correction at best. At worst, it is seen as a threat to the sanctity
of the ever-rarer jury verdict.
But the jury trial is only endangered, not yet extinct. And continuing to protect the
constitutional right to a jury requires appreciating the role of retrial within the due-process
framework. When the jury’s verdict contradicts the great weight of the evidence, the trial
judge is authorized to set aside that verdict and order a new trial. This power, sometimes
called the “thirteenth juror” rule, dates back to the Blackstonian era. It exists in both civil
and criminal cases, in both state and federal court. Over time, however, the trial court’s
power to review the weight of the evidence has fallen into a state of doctrinal disorder and
inconsistency.
This Article argues that the judge’s ability to order a new trial on the weight of the
evidence should be understood as a safeguard against invisible error. Invisible error arises
when improper jury decision-making hides behind the shroud of rules protecting the jury’s
deliberative secrecy. Invisible error can be caused either by the jury’s innocent
misunderstanding (of the court’s instruction or of an attorney’s presentation of evidence)
or by more egregious juror misconduct or undisclosed bias. The attorneys and the court
see only the result of the jury’s decision-making, not the erroneous procedure that led to
that result. The possibility of such error, however, is no reason to jettison the jury
altogether. The jury has strengths that cannot be matched by judges alone, including the
power of group deliberation, a greater diversity in its members, and a more accurate
reflection of the community. Judges, by contrast, possess greater experience with a range
of cases and a better understanding of how the facts and the law interrelate in the case.
The judge’s power to review the weight of the evidence complements the jury’s role
and protects the integrity of the trial process. Even when the judge cannot identify a
particular process error, the judge may have an intuitive sense that a jury has gone astray.
Weight-of-the-evidence review protects both of these complementary roles: the jury is
given the independence to allow full, free, and confidential deliberation, while the judge is
permitted to exercise the discretion gained from experience to prevent a miscarriage of
justice. Even in the era of the endangered jury and vanishing trial, judges should embrace
their power to order a new trial when justice demands it.
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Invisible Error
CASSANDRA BURKE ROBERTSON *
INTRODUCTION
First-year law students learn that there are two primary bases on which
a losing party can request a new trial: process errors, such as erroneously
admitted evidence or improper attorney argument, and weight-of-theevidence points, where the trial judge concludes that the evidence at trial
weighed strongly against the jury’s verdict.1 This article argues that those
seemingly different grounds for retrial are really two sides of the same
problem. What we think of as weight-of-the-evidence review is also an
attempt to correct for process errors.
But unlike typical process errors that can be raised by the attorney and
corrected through ordinary trial and appeal mechanisms, invisible error
arises when improper jury decision-making hides behind the shroud of rules
protecting the jury’s deliberative secrecy. Invisible error may arise from the
ordinary failures of communication between the court and members of the
jury—an innocent misunderstanding—or it may arise from more egregious
juror misbehavior or undisclosed bias. In some cases, it may even arise at a
subconscious level, as when the court instructs the jury to disregard trial
testimony but the jurors are unable to forget what they have heard.2 Because
these errors are invisible to both the judge and to the lawyers who could
*
John Deaver Drinko—BakerHostetler Professor of Law and Director of the Center for
Professional Ethics, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to Sharona Hoffman,
Jacqueline Lipton, William Ray, Mike Weston, and participants at the 2016 National Foundation for
Judicial Excellence (NFJE) Symposium for valuable discussions and feedback that contributed to this
project.
1
See, e.g., JOSEPH W. GLANNON, ANDREW M. PERLMAN & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: A COURSEBOOK 1106 (2011) (defining “process errors” as errors that “occurred in the
conduct of trial or the jury’s deliberations” and “weight-of-the evidence errors” as cases in which the
judge finds the jury’s verdict to be “clearly wrong” and unsupported by the evidence). The casebook
authors call Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 “coyly unhelpful” in revealing the proper grounds for a
new trial, as the rule provides broadly that a new trial may be ordered “after a jury trial, for any reason
for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Id. (quoting FED.
R. CIV. P. 59).
2
Similar to how the admonition “Don’t think about an elephant!” typically backfires, jurors may
be unable to put such information aside when they begin deliberations. SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE
S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 108–09 (1988); see
also United States v. Moreno, 991 F.2d 943, 951 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 971 (1993) (“In
fact, juries are even more likely to consider such evidence if admonished by the court not to consider it,
than if no specific instruction is given.”); Meir Dan-Cohen, Skirmishes on the Temporal Boundaries of
States, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 100 (2009) (“[D]eliberate attempts at forgetting are notoriously
counterproductive (‘don’t think about an elephant’) and precarious, easily reversible by anyone who cares
to provide a reminder.”).
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otherwise object, they are correctable only indirectly through the grant of a
new trial on the weight of the evidence.
A case recently decided by the Supreme Court shows the danger of
invisible error,3 offering what Justice Kagan referred to as “the best
smoking-gun evidence you’re ever going to see about race bias in the jury
room.”4 The underlying case dealt with a contested eyewitness
identification. Two teenagers, daughters of a horse-racing jockey, were
subjected to harassment and were groped in a racetrack bathroom.5 After
they reported the assault to their father, he connected their description of the
assailant to racetrack worker Miguel Peña-Rodriguez, and the girls later
identified the worker to police.6 A coworker provided alibi testimony,
asserting that Peña-Rodriguez was with him elsewhere at the time the assault
occurred.7 Nonetheless, Peña-Rodriguez was charged with unlawful sexual
contact and was convicted at trial.8
After the verdict was final, Peña-Rodriguez learned that a juror had
stated during deliberations that he “believed that [the defendant] was guilty
because in his experience as an ex-law enforcement officer, Mexican men
had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they
wanted with women.”9 On appeal, both sides agreed that the juror’s
statement erroneously injected racial bias into the jury’s decision-making.
However, evidentiary prohibitions against jurors impeaching their own
verdict prevented the defendant from seeking relief from the discriminatory
verdict.10 All parties acknowledged that some injustice necessarily arises
from the combination of deliberative secrecy and a rule forbidding jurors
from later impeaching their verdicts, as cases involving jury
misunderstanding or misconduct will go unremedied. But the question
before the Court was whether that no-impeachment rule violated the
defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.
In a 5-3 opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court
provided a remedy to the petitioner. The Court acknowledged that the
Colorado rules of evidence—like the federal rules—contain a strict
no-impeachment rule that extends even to factual testimony about the jury’s
deliberation.11 Nevertheless, the Court held this no-impeachment rule
3
See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2017) (holding that where a juror makes a
clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes to convict a criminal defendant, the
Sixth Amendment permits the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement).
4
Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/15-606_5iel.pdf (2017).
5
Amended Opening Brief at 1–2, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (No.
13SC0009), 2013 WL 12140027, at 1–2.
6
Id. at 1–3.
7
Id. at 4.
8
Id.
9
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 350 P.3d 287, 289 (Co. 2015), rev’d 137 S. Ct. 1513 (2016).
10
Id.; FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
11
Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.

2018]

INVISIBLE ERROR

165

violated Peña-Rodriguez’s constitutional right to an impartial jury and it
remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court specified that such a
remedy was available only in a case of “overt racial bias that cast serious
doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and
resulting verdict” and further required the racial animus have been “a
significant motivating factor” in the juror’s vote.12 At the same time, the
Court distinguished other cases where the no-impeachment rule would
prevail (including other types of juror bias and misconduct), holding that
although such cases were “troubling and unacceptable,” they did not
represent the same systemic threat to the justice system as a whole, but
instead “involved anomalous behavior from a single jury—or juror—gone
off course.”13
Thus, although Peña-Rodriguez was able to obtain a remedy, his case
shows the risk of hidden bias and misconduct. First, although the Court
grants relief for “overt” racial bias that ultimately came to light after the trial,
it cannot remedy covert bias. It is likely that some number of other jury
verdicts are similarly tainted, but remain shrouded by secrecy. Second,
although the Court is certainly correct that racial bias is a uniquely potent
threat to judicial legitimacy, any systemic unfairness can also threaten the
administration of justice. And while a single case of misconduct may be
“anomalous behavior,” a series of such cases represents a more significant
problem.
Thus, in spite of the Court’s remedy in Peña-Rodriguez, the underlying
tension remains: the deliberative process requires protecting juror privacy
and encouraging openness, but those same values of privacy and openness
create room for verdicts to be infected by prejudice, bias, and
misunderstanding. The Peña-Rodriguez case is unusual (and therefore
potentially remediable) only because information about the jury’s
deliberation was later revealed. In most cases, the parties, lawyers, and judge
will never know what happened in the jury room.14 And even if the biased
statements in Peña-Rodriguez had never come to light, the case would have
been a good candidate for retrial on the weight of the evidence. Because
there was direct eyewitness testimony of the defendant’s guilt, a directed
verdict of acquittal would have been improper; there was legally sufficient
evidence to reach a jury, because it is well within the jury’s purview to credit
the victim’s testimony. But because that evidence was relatively weak—
research has shown eyewitness testimony to be often unreliable, after all,
and the victim’s testimony was rebutted by an alibi witness with no motive
12

Id.
Id. at 868.
14
See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee’s note to S. REP. No. 93-1277 (“Jurors will not be
able to function effectively if their deliberations are to be scrutinized in post-trial litigation. In the interest
of protecting the jury system and the citizens who make it work, rule 606 should not permit any inquiry
into the internal deliberations of the jurors.”).
13
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15

to lie —the judge could well have found that the jury’s verdict was contrary
to the great weight of the evidence. It is not clear, however, whether such an
argument was pursued in the trial court; on appeal, the defendant appeared
to focus solely on the later-revealed racial bias.16
The Supreme Court has identified a number of procedural safeguards to
ensure that the jury competently performs its role, including active pretrial
questioning and jurors’ ability to report problems prior to reaching a
verdict.17 And for the most part, these safeguards work. Studies have found
that the judge would have reached the same verdict as the jury in
approximately four out of every five cases.18 Nonetheless, we know that
there is a subset of cases in which the process goes off track. Researchers
authorized to record jury deliberations found that “[e]ven with the camera
rolling, jurors compromised on verdicts, allowed personality conflicts to
interfere with the deliberations, and oversimplified the judge’s
instructions.”19
The trial judge’s power to evaluate the weight of the evidence and to
order a retrial helps to fill the gap created when deliberative secrecy and
post-verdict anti-impeachment rules conceal the presence of what would
otherwise be reversible error. Even when the judge cannot identify a
particular process error, he or she may have an intuitive sense that a jury has
gone astray.20 Ordering a new trial on the weight of the evidence thereby

15
There was additional evidence of bias in the jury’s evaluation of the witness’s testimony; one
juror found the witness to be less credible because he was, in the juror’s words, “an illegal.” PeñaRodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862.
16
See Amended Opening Brief at 9, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (No.
13SC0009), 2013 WL 12140027, at 9 (arguing for reversal based on racial bias).
17
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (noting that such safeguards include (1) voir
dire; (2) juror observation “by the court, by counsel, and by court personnel”; (3) jurors’ ability to “report
inappropriate juror behavior to the court before they render a verdict”; and (4) post-verdict impeachment
not non-jurors).
18
NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 148–51 (2007).
19
Diane E. Courselle, Struggling with Deliberative Secrecy, Jury Independence, and Jury Reform,
57 S.C.L. REV. 203, 229 (2005).
20
This sense is likely to arise in a subset of the 20 percent of the cases where the judge disagrees
with the jury’s verdict. See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 18, at 148–51 (describing the rate of
disagreement). In many cases where the judge and jury disagree, it is easy to characterize the result as
merely a case where reasonable minds can disagree. But in other cases, although there is sufficient
evidence to support the ultimate result, the jury’s verdict may be so strongly against the overall weight
of the evidence that the judge is convinced that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. It is this subset of
cases where the judge may suspect that the jury’s finding is based on something other than a thorough
analysis of the evidence. See Hilborn v. Metro. Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 306 F.R.D. 651, 655 (D. Idaho
2015) (awarding a new trial on the weight of the evidence in an insurance coverage case, although the
jury found that the insured husband had conspired with his wife to willfully misrepresent relevant facts
on the insurance application, because the judge was convinced after seeing the husband’s trial testimony
that he was “a man of limited cognitive abilities” who “evidenced a less than complete understanding of
the process for submitting an insurance claim and the court proceedings” and thus the evidence weighed
strongly against finding a willful misrepresentation).
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allows for the correction of biased or mistaken verdicts even when jury-room
secrecy prevents the judge from knowing the source of that injustice.
Judicial power to order a new trial on the weight of the evidence exists
in both civil and criminal cases, and in both state and federal court.21
Different jurisdictions refer to the trial judge’s review of evidentiary weight
by different names: in some states it is called the judge’s power to act as a
“thirteenth juror,”22 while other states refer to it as the power to review the
“manifest weight”23 or “factual sufficiency”24 of the evidence.25 Federal
courts generally refer to it as “weight of the evidence” review.26 But by
whatever name it is known, it is a long-running power, recognized at
common law in Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England and
integrated into state and federal practice at the time of the founding of the
United States.27
Over the last century, however, the trial court’s power to review the
weight of the evidence has fallen into a state of doctrinal disorder and
inconsistency, becoming an afterthought (at best) in the trial process.28 At
the same time, trials themselves have become less common. The use of
21

Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 157, 162 (2008) (noting that
the procedure applies in both civil and criminal cases, and that state courts tend to depend upon the
remedy more than federal courts, though both include it in the trial judge’s power).
22
Norton v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 567 S.E.2d 851, 854 (S.C. 2002) (“South Carolina’s thirteenth
juror doctrine is so named because it entitles the trial judge to sit, in essence, as the thirteenth juror when
he finds ‘the evidence does not justify the verdict,’ and then to grant a new trial based solely ‘upon the
facts.’”).
23
See, e.g., Eastley v. Volkman, 972 N.E.2d 517, 523 (Ohio 2012) (“[E]ven if a trial court judgment
is sustained by sufficient evidence, an appellate court may nevertheless conclude that the judgment is
against the manifest weight of the evidence.”).
24
S.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 622 (Tex. 2004) (“Under traditional factual
sufficiency standards, a court determines if a finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of
the evidence that it is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly demonstrates bias.”).
25
Of course, the various state and federal doctrines are not identical. Norton v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,
567 S.E.2d 851, 854 (“Although the state and federal standards use some similar language, we do not
believe the standards, compared on the whole, are ‘substantially similar,’ or similar enough to be used
interchangeably.”). Nevertheless, they share a commonality: the trial judge’s power to grant a new trial
on the weight of the evidence.
26
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 433 (1996) (“‘The trial judge in the federal
system,’ we have reaffirmed, ‘has . . . discretion to grant a new trial if the verdict appears to [the judge]
to be against the weight of the evidence.’” (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S.
525, 540 (1958))).
27
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 387 (1978) (“[I]f it
appears by the judge’s report, certified to the court, that the jury have brought in a verdict without or
contrary to evidence, so that he is reasonably dissatisfied therewith; or if they have given exorbitant
damages; or if the judge himself has misdirected the jury, so that they found an unjustifiable verdict; for
these, and other reasons of the like kind, it is the practice of the court to award a new, or second, trial.”).
Blackstone noted that if two juries agreed, however, then a third trial should not be granted. The
presumption against a third trial likewise carries over into modern practice. See, e.g., Eastley, 972 N.E.2d
at 526 (noting than an appellate court may reverse “only once on manifest weight of the evidence”).
28
See infra Parts II and III (tracing the doctrinal variations in the trial judge’s power to review the
weight of the evidence and exploring the procedural forces that led to the doctrinal divergence and
confusion, respectively).
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alternative dispute resolution and a more managerial style among judges
encourage pretrial settlement, and an increased reliance on summary
judgment (in civil cases) and plea bargaining (in criminal cases) diverts even
more cases away from trial.29 As trials have declined, the number of cases
decided by a jury have accordingly declined as well.30
These two trends may be causally interrelated: as trials became less
common, it makes sense that courts would grow reluctant to order a second
trial on the weight of the evidence. After all, if one trial is a luxury, then two
trials would appear unaffordably decadent. In addition, judges may
unconsciously respond to the rarity of jury trials by attempting to protect the
remaining jury verdicts against encroachment from the bench—a fear of
“invading the province of the jury.”31
But regardless of the reason for it, it is clear that the trial judge’s power
to review evidentiary weight remains significantly undervalued in the
contemporary era of the vanishing trial. In the federal courts, litigants often
fail to raise weight-of-the-evidence challenges.32 Even when the parties do
challenge the weight of the evidence, the courts often apply inconsistent
standards in ruling on the motion, sometimes conflating the standard for a
new trial with the standard for judgment as a matter of law.33 In the state
courts, both litigants and judges tend to have greater experience with
weight-of-the-evidence review, and the standards are more likely to be
applied consistently within a given state.34 However, there is significant
29

See infra Part IV (examining how—and why—the trial judge’s power to act as a thirteenth juror
should be safeguarded even in the era of the vanishing trial); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment
Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 179 (2007) (arguing that the growth of summary judgment
contradicts the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases); Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should
We Really “Ban” Plea Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753,
760 (1998) (describing the rise in plea bargaining).
30
See SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE FUNDAMENTAL
CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES 2 (2016) (noting that in federal
court, the percentage of criminal cases tried by jury declined from 8.2 percent in 1962 to 3.6 percent in
2013, and the percentage of civil cases tried by jury declines from 5.5 percent in 1962 to 0.8 percent in
2013).
31
See Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We invade the
province of the jury only ‘if the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, is based upon false
or pernicious evidence or to prevent a miscarriage of justice.’”); Michael Seward, The Sufficiency-Weight
Distinction—A Matter of Life or Death, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 147, 161 (1983) (“When ruling that a
verdict is contrary to the weight of evidence, the judge does not invade the province of the jury; he simply
transfers the defendant from the province of an unfair or inept jury to the province of a new jury.”).
32
Robertson, supra note 21, at 170; see also, e.g., Morfiah v. City of Philadelphia, No. 15-2139,
2016 WL 4151209, at *1 (3d Cir. Aug. 5, 2016) (finding that a litigant had waived the opportunity to
seek a new trial on the weight of the evidence by failing to raise it in the trial court).
33
See infra Part II (tracing the doctrinal variations in the trial judge’s power to review the weight
of the evidence); Robertson, supra note 21, at 170 (noting that the federal courts ruled on sufficiency
points approximately ten times as often as weight points, which “suggests that attorneys are appealing
sufficiency points far more often than weight points,” but concluding that “if the attorneys think that
there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict, they would presumably also have a strong argument
that the verdict goes against the great weight of the evidence”).
34
See infra Part II.
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variation in the standards applied by different states, and there are still
occasions where courts seem to confuse the standard for a directed verdict
(based on insufficient evidence) with the standard for a new trial (based on
the weight of the evidence, not on its sufficiency).35
This Article argues in favor of a greater recognition of the trial judge’s
power to review the evidentiary weight and to order a new trial when the
jury’s verdict contradicts the great weight of the evidence. Following this
introduction, Part II traces the doctrinal variations in the trial judge’s power
to review the weight of the evidence. It looks at conflicting precedent in
three areas: how strongly the evidence must contradict the verdict, whether
the trial judge should view the evidence neutrally or more favorably to the
verdict winner, and whether the trial judge can independently assess witness
credibility. It further considers the underlying source of these doctrinal
variations: to what extent are the courts consciously diverging from one
another versus mistakenly applying different standards? When there is little
judicial attention given to the varying standards, it becomes very hard to tell
the difference.
Part III explores the procedural forces that led to the doctrinal
divergence and confusion. Normally, the process of appellate review
promotes the standardization of procedural application within a single
jurisdiction, and the “gravitational force” of federal law promotes
consistency (though not uniformity) between state and federal practice.36
However, due to a historical quirk, the federal circuit courts of appeals did
not begin widely reviewing trial judge rulings on the weight of the evidence
until the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Gasperini v. Center for the
Humanities.37 As a result, the new-trial remedy largely escaped the
traditional forces that promote procedural standardization.
Part IV examines how—and why—the trial judge’s power to act as a
thirteenth juror should be safeguarded even in the era of the vanishing trial.
I argue that the judge’s power to review the weight of the evidence improves
decisional accuracy by ensuring that the evidence as a whole is not just
legally sufficient, but is also strong enough to allow the factfinders to have
confidence in the ultimate verdict. Furthermore, the trial judge’s power to
review the weight of the evidence protects the deliberative process itself,
guarding against the risk that the jury’s deliberations might be infected by
bias, prejudice, or any other non-evidentiary basis for decision-making.

35
See infra Part II; Robertson, supra note 21, at 172 (“Courts have treated such arguments instead
as sufficiency points, seeming to ignore their own precedent about the difference between weight and
sufficiency.”).
36
Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 706 (2016)
(“[F]ederal law exerts a widespread gravitational pull on state actors.”); Cassandra Burke Robertson, The
Right to Appeal, 91 N.C.L. REV. 1219, 1225 (2013) (explaining that the appellate system serves to
“increas[e] uniformity and standardization in the application of legal rules”).
37
Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 435 (1996).
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Finally, I consider whether the review of evidentiary weight is protected by
the constitutional guarantee of due process, and I conclude that it should be.
I.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT: CONFUSION,
VARIATION, AND DISAGREEMENT

When invisible error within the jury process leads to a fundamentally
unjust verdict, trial judges have the power to overturn that verdict and order
a new trial. This power to re-weigh the evidence has a long pedigree. By the
time of the 1768 publication of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England, it was already well established that the judge could and should
grant a new trial if convinced that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the “clear
weight” of the evidence.38 This responsibility—often known as the
“thirteenth juror”39 rule—was incorporated into the early common law of the
original colonies, and subsequently became part of both state and federal
procedure throughout the United States. By 1899, the Supreme Court
recognized that the judge’s power to set aside a jury verdict as against the
weight of the evidence was an essential safeguard of the jury-trial process:
‘Trial by jury,’ in the primary and usual sense of the term at
the common law and in the American constitutions, is not
merely a trial by a jury of twelve men before an officer vested
with authority to cause them to be summoned and empaneled,
to administer oaths to them and to the constable in charge, and
to enter judgment and issue execution on their verdict; but it is
a trial by a jury of twelve men in the presence and under the
superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on the
law and to advise them on the facts, and (except on acquittal
of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict, if, in his
opinion, it is against the law or the evidence.40
This power has continued into the modern era, as trial judges may
exercise the authority to grant a new trial on the weight of the evidence in
both criminal and civil cases. In criminal cases, of course, the review is onesided: if the jury votes to acquit the defendant, then double jeopardy prevents
further review.41 Only when the jury votes to convict does the trial judge’s
responsibility come into play, and then the judge must normally make two
findings: first, whether there was sufficient evidence to support the
38

William V. Dorsaneo, III, Reexamining the Right to Trial by Jury, 54 SMU L. REV. 1695, 1719
(2001) (“The power of trial judges to grant new trials because verdicts or particular jury findings are
contrary to the clear weight of the evidence is universally recognized and supported by ample common
law precedent.” (citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 387 (1768))).
39
See Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 44 n.5 (1981) (“Whether a state trial judge in a jury trial
may assess evidence as a ‘13th juror’ is a question of state law.”).
40
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1899) (emphasis added).
41
See Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981) (acknowledging “the unreviewable power of a
jury to return a verdict of not guilty [even] for impermissible reasons”).
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conviction (that is, was there sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty), and
second, even if the evidence is sufficient such that a reasonable juror could
potentially find the defendant guilty, whether the overall weight of the
evidence supports that finding.42 If the judge concludes that the evidence is
legally insufficient, then the remedy is acquittal.43 If, on the other hand, “the
court concludes that, despite the abstract sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the verdict, the evidence preponderates sufficiently heavily against
the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred,” then the
court “may set aside the verdict, grant a new trial, and submit the issues for
determination by another jury.”44
In civil cases, the trial judge’s review of the weight of the evidence is
more balanced. Regardless of whether the jury’s verdict favored the plaintiff
or defendant, the judge can award a new trial upon finding that the weight
of the evidence preponderated heavily in the opposite direction.45 In civil
cases, this power allows the judge to consider the overall amount of the
verdict as well, and to suggest a remittitur if the damage award is “entirely
disproportionate” to the injury.46
Thus, in both state and federal courts, and in civil and criminal cases,
trial judges have long possessed the power to grant a new trial when the
jury’s findings run counter to “the clear weight of the evidence.”47 In spite
of the long history of this practice and its near-universal adoption, however,
the standards by which judges weigh the evidence and determine when to
grant a new trial are chaotic and inconsistent.48
In this Part, I explore the various standards applied in different state and
federal courts, seeking to tease out the approaches. Courts rarely address
42
See People v. Danielson, 880 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2007) (noting that the judge should decide
“[b]ased on the weight of the credible evidence . . . whether the jury was justified in finding the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”).
43
See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (“Since we hold today that the Double Jeopardy
Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient, the
only ‘just’ remedy available for that court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal.”).
44
United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980).
45
See 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2806 (3d
ed. 2017) (“On a motion for a new trial—unlike a motion for a judgment as a matter of law—the judge
may set aside the verdict even though there is substantial evidence to support it.”).
46
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 59.13[2] [f] & [g] (3d ed. 2013); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Shady Grove and the Potential Democracy-Enhancing Benefits of Erie Formalism, 44 AKRON L. REV.
907, 975 & n.202 (2011) (noting that “anyone who has ever practiced in federal court knows that a jury
verdict is in great danger of being set aside as against the weight of the evidence if the presiding federal
trial judge views the amount awarded as unreasonable,” and pointing out the same logic applies “to
review of verdict size as well as verdict direction”).
47
See Dorsaneo supra note 38, at 1719 (“The power of trial judges to grant new trials because
verdicts or particular jury findings are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence is universally
recognized and supported by ample common law precedent.”).
48
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, at § 2806 (“The power of a federal judge to grant a new trial
on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence is clear. The standard that is to
control in passing on motions of this kind is not.”).
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these varying approaches explicitly. Their opinions tend to fall within three
different categories. The first—but rarest—category is “open
disagreement,” where courts explicitly disagree with one another,
intentionally and explicitly applying different standards. In the second
category, “implicit doctrinal variation,” different courts and circuits apply
different standards without acknowledging that they are doing so.49 These
differences may either stem from confusion or they may be fully intentional,
but because they remain latent in the court’s holding, they often fall below
the radar of advocates or reviewing courts that might otherwise seek greater
standardization.50 Finally, the third category is one of “doctrinal confusion”
where the same courts, or the same circuits, apply inconsistent standards
without realizing that they are doing so, based on an underlying “lack of
conceptual clarity.”51 The boundaries between these three categories are
necessarily indistinct and mutable. Thus, for example, implicit doctrinal
variation may stem either from underlying confusion and misunderstanding
of existing doctrine or from an intentional (though not explicit) decision to
apply a differing standard.52
A. How Strongly Must the Evidence Contradict the Verdict?
One area of significant disagreement is the degree of injustice the judge
must find before ordering a new trial. That is, how heavily must the evidence
weigh against the jury’s verdict, and how strongly convinced must the judge
be that the jury erred? On this question, court decisions appear to fall
primarily within the category of “implicit doctrinal variation,” as courts
apply different standards without explicitly acknowledging the variation and
only rarely acknowledging any differences. In some of these “implicit
variation” cases, courts will articulate the same overall standard of review,
but will then apply it so differently that an inconsistent result is achieved
even while the same standard is ostensibly used.
In theory, therefore, the federal circuits should be applying the same
test—or at least should be applying the same test within the broad categories
of civil or criminal cases. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow the
49
See, e.g., Robert Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-Doctrine: An Empirical Assessment of Judicial
Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1045, 1076 (2009) (discussing how a
judicial philosophy of minimalism can give rise to generalist, non-detail-specific opinions and thus
“allows people with diverse doctrinal preferences to bury their differences and compromise”).
50
See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Doctrinal Categories, Legal Realism, and the Rule of Law, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 1889, 1903 (2015) (explaining that “the existing doctrinal landscape . . . often reflects valuable
normative choices, even if implicit and sometimes imperfectly executed”).
51
See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA.
L. REV. 67, 124 (2012) (describing similar confusion in the intellectual-property context, and explaining
that “[t]he doctrinal confusion reflects a lack of conceptual clarity about the conduct that is regulated by”
different intellectual property doctrines).
52
See, e.g., Benjamin C. Sassé, Note, Curfew Laws, Freedom of Movement, and the Rights of
Juveniles, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681, 698 (2000) (analyzing whether a circuit split over the right to
travel arose from “doctrinal disagreement” or “sloppy rights talk”).
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judge to grant a new trial “after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new
trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court,”53 and
that rule has been held to include situations in which “the district court finds
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are
excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its
course.”54 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure similarly authorize a
district judge to grant a new trial when “the interest of justice so requires.”55
Scholars have explained that although the text of the rule “does not mention
[evidentiary weight] explicitly . . . courts have long recognized this
foundational reason for a new trial.”56
In practice, however, there is significant variation even in similar cases.
A majority of federal courts appear to require that the judge find the verdict
to be against the “great weight,” “clear weight,” or “manifest weight” of the
evidence.57 Thus, in a close case, where the evidence is “profuse, somewhat
fragmentary, and conflicting in critical areas,” the trial judge should not
grant a new trial even if he or she ultimately disagrees with the jury’s
conclusion.58 Instead, the courts following this position have held that jury
verdicts should be overturned only “in an egregious case, to correct a
seriously erroneous result, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice.”59
A minority of federal decisions apply a more lenient standard, however,
allowing the trial judge to exercise unfettered discretion in ordering a new
trial on the weight of the evidence upon mere disagreement with the jury’s
verdict.60 In a rare case of explicit acknowledgement of the different
standards, the Third Circuit has pointed to these varying lines of authority
without clearly adopting either of them.61 Scholars have pointed out that
53

FED. R. CIV. P. 59.
Smith v. Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985).
55
FED. R. CRIM. P. 33.
56
3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 582 (4th ed.
2011).
57
See Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Appeals, 229 F.R.D. 267,
318–19 (2005) (“Such new trial motions, it is traditionally stated, should not be granted by the trial court
unless the verdict is against the ‘great weight of the evidence,’ or the ‘clear weight of the evidence.’”
(citing Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1982); Conway v. Chemical Leaman
Tank Lines, 610 F.2d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 1980); Taylor v. Fletcher Properties, Inc., 592 F.2d 244, 247
(5th Cir. 1979); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940); Wassell v. Adams, 865
F.2d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1989))).
58
Conway, 610 F.2d at 367 (5th Cir. 1980).
59
Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 418–19 (2d Cir. 2012).
60
See, e.g., Fortenberry v. New York Life Ins. Co., 459 F.2d 114, 116 (6th Cir. 1972) (upholding
the grant of a new trial based on the trial judge’s statement that he was “not satisfied that the evidence
supports the verdict,” and stating that the decision was “within the discretionary power of the judge”);
Murphy v. U.S. Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., Southern Division, 145 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir.
1944).
61
Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir. 1960) (“What we have stated demonstrates
that there is no consensus of opinion as to the exact standards to be used by a trial court in granting a new
trial and that the criteria to be employed by an appellate tribunal charged with reviewing the trial judge’s
decision in this respect are equally indefinite.”).
54
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these decisions are older and do not seem consistent with modern trends.62
It may well be that the standards have shifted over time, slowly restricting
the judge’s discretion to grant a new trial and reallocating authority between
judge and jury in federal court. Nonetheless, because these cases remain in
the “implicit variation” category, it is unclear whether and to what extent
this is a significant shift in authority or merely a change of nomenclature.
State-court decisions reflect a similar split. Most states apply a rule
similar to the majority of federal courts, allowing a new trial only when the
judge finds the jury’s verdict to be contrary to the “manifest weight” or the
“great weight” of the evidence, or when the jury’s verdict would result in a
“manifest injustice.”63 Like their federal counterparts, they hold that “[a]
new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony
or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different
conclusion.”64
In these states, there is a high evidentiary threshold for granting a new
trial. The Mississippi Supreme Court, for example, has stated that “the
power to grant a new trial should be invoked only in exceptional cases in
which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.”65 The
Virginia Supreme Court has held that a new trial should be granted only
when “the evidence [is] plainly insufficient to warrant the finding of the
jury.”66 The Ohio Supreme Court has gone even further, holding that in a
civil case, as long as there is “some competent, credible evidence going to
all the essential elements of the case,” then the judgment “will not be
reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the
evidence.”67 An Arizona intermediate court similarly suggested that a new
trial should be denied as long as “substantial evidence supports the jury
verdict,”68 though the Arizona Supreme Court recently overturned that
decision, holding that the “trial judge has broad discretion . . . to find the
verdict inconsistent with the evidence and grant a new trial, so as to guard
against arbitrary verdicts.”69

62

See WRIGHT, supra note 45, at § 2806 (“The unlimited-discretion standard, however, seems to
have fallen out of favor with modern courts, as evidenced by its absence from recent opinions.”).
63
See, e.g., Rohde v. Farmer, 262 N.E.2d 685, 691 (Ohio 1970) (holding that a new trial is
appropriate when “it appears to the trial court that a manifest injustice has been done, and that the verdict
is against the manifest weight of the evidence”).
64
Com. v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751–52 (Pa. 2000).
65
Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 844 (Miss. 2005).
66
Leigh v. Com., 66 S.E.2d 586, 593 (Va. 1951).
67
State v. Wilson, 865 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (Ohio 2007). The court has applied a broader standard
in criminal cases, concluding that a criminal conviction could be overturned on the weight of the evidence
if the reviewing court concludes that the defendant’s evidence was “more persuasive” than the state’s.
Id. at 1269.
68
State v. Fischer, 360 P.3d 105, 110–11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015), as amended (Oct. 8, 2015), and
rev’d, 242 Ariz. 44, 392 P.3d 488, 494 (Ariz. 2017).
69
State v. Fischer, 392 P.3d 488, 494 (Ariz. 2017).
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Nevertheless, the state courts—again, like their federal counterparts—
have split on the question of how much discretion the trial judge can exercise
in granting a new trial. Unlike their federal counterparts, some states
continue to apply a much more lenient standard even in the modern era.
Rhode Island, for example, allows the trial court to grant a new trial when it
determines that the “verdict is against the fair preponderance of the evidence
and fails to do substantial justice.”70 North Dakota has held that “when [the
trial judge’s] judgment tells him that it is wrong, that, whether from mistake,
or prejudice, or other cause, the jury have erred, and found against the fair
preponderance of the evidence, then no duty is more imperative than that of
setting aside the verdict, and remanding the question to another jury.”71 Iowa
“allows the court to grant a motion for new trial only if more evidence
supports the alternative verdict as opposed to the verdict rendered.”72
Likewise, the Florida Supreme Court has emphasized that the trial
judge’s experience should be employed to avoid an “unjust verdict.”73 It
reversed an intermediate court decision that had applied a stricter standard,
holding that “[t]he trial judge’s discretion permits the grant of a new trial
[even when it] is not ‘clear, obvious, and indisputable that the jury was
wrong,’” and that “[t]he fact that there may be substantial, competent
evidence in the record to support the jury verdict does not necessarily
demonstrate that the trial judge abused his or her discretion.”74
Because the states are separate sovereigns, there is less incentive for
state courts to examine precedent outside their jurisdiction and there is no
reason why individual states should not apply different standards.
Nonetheless, it is striking both that the split among the states reflects a
similar split in the standards applied by federal courts, and also that opinions
from both state and federal courts only rarely discuss the varying standards.
It has often been said that the states may perform a “vital function” as
“laboratories of democracy,”75 but that function can only be served if those

70

State v. Mondesir, 891 A.2d 856, 862 n.3 (R.I. 2006).
State v. Kringstad, 353 N.W.2d 302, 307 (N.D. 1984) (quoting Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kunkel,
17 Kan. 145, 152 (1876)).
72
State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016).
73
Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So. 2d 490, 497 (Fla. 1999).
74
Id.
75
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2015)
(“This Court has ‘long recognized the role of the States as laboratories for devising solutions to difficult
legal problems.’” (quoting Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009) and citing United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he States may perform their role as laboratories
for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.”)); New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
71
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laboratories acknowledge that they are, in fact, applying different standards
and recording the results of their experiments with those standards.76
B. In What Light Should the Evidence be Viewed?
There are also conflicting holdings from both state and federal courts
about whether the trial judge should view the evidence in the “light most
favorable” to the verdict in ruling on a motion for a new trial. Variance on
this issue, however, appears to be a clearer case of doctrinal confusion. In
particular, courts requiring the judge to view the evidence in the “most
favorable light” are likely conflating the standard for a directed verdict with
the standard for granting a new trial.77 Certainly, a court may grant judgment
as a matter of law only if, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, the court determines that no reasonable juror could
have reached the relevant conclusion.78 Thus, if a directed verdict is
inappropriate, then there logically must be some legally sufficient evidence
to support the jury’s verdict. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury’s decision would seem to foreclose the possibility of
ever granting a new trial on the weight of the evidence: if the evidence is
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, then either the court should
grant a judgment as a matter of law or allow the jury’s verdict to stand.79
Nonetheless, there continues to be disagreement. These opposing views
can be seen in the contrasting opinions of the Mississippi Supreme Court
and the Alaska Supreme Court. In Mississippi, the court held that “the
evidence should be weighed in the light most favorable to the verdict.”80 In
Alaska, by contrast, the court reversed the underlying judgment because the
judge had mistakenly viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict instead of “independently weigh[ing]” the evidence.81
76

E.g.,
Adam
Savage,
Titanic
Survival,
MYTHBUSTERS
(2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BSUMBBFjxrY (“Remember kids, the only difference between
screwing around and science is writing it down.”).
77
11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2806 (3d ed.
2016) (not that generally taking the “most favorable view” is not required, but that “[t]here are erroneous
statements to the contrary in a few cases that have confused the standard on a new-trial motion with that
on a directed-verdict motion”).
78
See, e.g., Moore v. Singh, 755 S.E.2d 319, 321 (Ga. App. 2014) (“A directed verdict is authorized
only when there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with
all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict. A grant of directed verdict is a
ruling that the evidence and all reasonable deductions therefrom demand a particular verdict.”).
79
Robertson, supra note 21, at 187 (“The court’s stated task is to determine if the evidence
preponderates heavily against the verdict. Thus, if it views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, it is presuming the answer to the very question it seeks to answer.”).
80
Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 844 (Miss. 2005).
81
Kava v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 48 P.3d 1170, 1176 (Alaska 2002) (“In deciding a motion for a
new trial on this basis, the court must use its discretion and independently weigh the evidence. A court
may set aside a verdict as being against the weight of the evidence even when ‘there is substantial
evidence to support it.’”).
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Federal courts tend to agree more consistently that the trial judge should
weigh the evidence neutrally in ruling on a motion for a new trial.82 The
Fourth Circuit—like the Alaska Supreme Court—has at least twice reversed
trial court judgments that used the “most favorable light” language.83 Even
among the federal courts of appeals, however, there is occasionally loose
language that suggests that the “most favorable light” standard should apply
even in reviewing a motion for a new trial on the weight of the evidence.84
C. Can the Trial Judge Independently Assess Witness Credibility?
Finally, courts have also taken different positions about what evidence
the judge should consider in deciding whether the evidence against the
verdict is strong enough to warrant a new trial. Assessing credibility is, of
course, one of the primary functions of the jury—as is the responsibility to
weigh the evidence.85 The vast majority of federal courts have held that the
trial judge may consider witness credibility in determining whether the great
weight of the evidence contradicted the jury’s verdict.86 The First Circuit has
held, for example, that “[t]he trial judge, upon considering a motion for new
trial, may consider the credibility of the witnesses who had testified and, of
course, will consider the weight of the evidence.”87

82

Robertson, supra note 21, at 181 (citing Song v. Ives Lab., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“In contrast to the standard applied in considering a motion for judgment n.o.v., a trial judge hearing a
motion for a new trial is free to weigh the evidence himself and need not view it in the light most favorable
to the verdict winner.” (citation and internal quotations omitted))); Smith v. Tidewater Marine Towing,
927 F.2d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1312 (11th Cir. 1985);
Altrichter v. Shell Oil Co., 263 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1959); Williams v. Nichols, 266 F.2d 389 (4th
Cir. 1959); Magee v. General Motors Corp., 213 F.2d 899, 900 (3d Cir. 1954).
83
Robertson, supra note 21, at 183 & n.134 (citing Gill v. Rollins Protective Services Co., 773 F.2d
592, 595 (4th Cir. 1985); Williams v. Nichols, 266 F.2d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 1959)).
84
Id. at 183, n.138, 141 (citing Ellsworth v. Tuttle, 148 Fed. Appx. 653, 669–670 (10th Cir. 2005);
Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2004); Brown v. City of McComb Miss. Police Dep’t,
84 Fed. Appx. 404, 406 (5th Cir. 2003); Sherman v. Chrysler Corp., 47 Fed. Appx. 716, 724 (6th Cir.
2002)).
85
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (“Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of the legitimate inferences from the facts
are jury functions, not those of a judge.”).
86
Robertson, supra note 21, at 181.
87
MacQuarrie v. Howard Johnson Co., 877 F.2d 126, 132 (1st Cir. 1989). The Second, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have made similar statements. United States v.
Tarango, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 2170, 12–13 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165,
1170 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Washington, 184 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Rogers, 918 F.2d 207, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Ashworth, 836 F.2d 260, 266 (6th Cir.
1988); United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir.1980); see also United States v. Hernandez,
433 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005) (“On a motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence,
the court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. It may weigh the evidence
and consider the credibility of the witnesses.”); Song v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d
Cir. 1992) (noting that, in ruling on a motion for new trial, the district court “was in a unique position to
assess the credibility of the witnesses and to determine the weight which should be accorded their
testimony”); Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880 F.2d 176, 190 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The judge
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Again, however, there is variation in holdings. Opinions from both the
Third and the Fourth Circuits have overturned district court new-trial rulings
for failing to defer to jury determinations of credibility.88 Neither case went
so far as to say that the trial judge could not consider credibility.
Nonetheless, their holdings at least implicitly restrained the trial judge’s
authority to do so. The Third Circuit, for example, concluded that when
“litigation deals with material which is familiar and simple, the evidence
relating to ordinary commercial practices,” the trial court will abuse its
discretion by “substitut[ing] its judgment for that of the jury” on matters of
credibility. Likewise, the Fourth Circuit similarly held that greater deference
should be given to the jury “where the subject matter of the trial is easily
comprehended by a lay jury,” and “minor inconsistencies” in a witness’s
testimony are not significant enough to overcome the jury’s decision to find
the witness credible.89
States also vary as to whether they allow the trial judge to independently
evaluate witness credibility in determining whether the jury’s verdict goes
against the great weight of the evidence. The majority view is that judges
can (and should) assess witness credibility. Thus, for example, the Florida
Supreme Court has held that a trial judge “must necessarily” consider
witness credibility in evaluating the weight of the evidence.90 Likewise, the
Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the court in “reviewing the entire record,
weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences [and] considers the
credibility of witnesses.”91 Iowa, Mississippi, and Rhode Island all follow
the same rule that trial judges may assess credibility, although, as noted
above, the evidentiary standard for a new trial appears to be somewhat lower
in Iowa and Rhode Island than in Mississippi.92
Other states, however, restrict the trial judge’s consideration of
credibility. A Texas court conducting a similar review, for example, must
defer to the jury’s credibility determinations as long as those determinations

can weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses, and need not view the evidence from the
perspective most favorable to the prevailing party in ruling on a motion for a new trial.”).
88
Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 91 (3d Cir. 1960); Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport
Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 201 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Robertson, supra note 21, at 183 (highlighting
conflicting opinions in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh circuits).
89
Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 201 (4th Cir. 2000).
90
Smith v. Brown, 525 So. 2d 868, 870 (Fla. 1988).
91
State v. Thompkins, 678 N.E.2d 541, 547 (Ohio 1997) (quoting State v. Martin, 485 N.E.2d 717,
720 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983)). See also State v. McKnight, 837 N.E.2d 315, 334 (Ohio 2005) (noting that
in Ohio, the trial judge may consider witness credibility in ruling on a motion for new trial based on the
manifest weight of the evidence).
92
See State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016) (“The question for the court is . . . whether
‘a greater amount of credible evidence’ suggests the verdict rendered was a miscarriage of justice.”);
Butera v. Boucher, 798 A.2d 340, 348 (R.I. 2002) (using an abuse of discretion standard); Miley v. State,
935 So. 2d 998, 1002 (Miss. 2006) (noting that a new trial is appropriate when the judge disagrees with
the “jury’s resolution of conflicting testimony” such that an “unconscionable injustice” would result from
the verdict).

2018]

INVISIBLE ERROR

179

93

are not unreasonable. And in Illinois, the Supreme Court has held that a
trial court’s decision to set aside a jury verdict should be reversed because
“it is the province of the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass
upon the credibility of the witnesses, and to decide what weight should be
given to the witnesses’ testimony.”94 The court was therefore—at least
implicitly—restricting the trial judge’s authority to independently assess
witness credibility.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINAL DISORDER
The doctrinal confusion described in the prior section hinders the
administration of justice and gives rise to systemic procedural inequalities.
Some of its consequences are obvious. For example, how easy or difficult it
is for a verdict loser to obtain a new trial can vary both by geographic
location and by the choice of federal or state forum.95 Other consequences
of the doctrinal disorder are more covert, but still real. For example, when
the review of evidentiary weight is available only inconsistently, it loses
salience, as courts and litigants alike come to rely on it less.96 But when a
new trial is unavailable to remedy a manifestly unjust jury verdict, one of
two consequences will result: either the unjust jury verdict will stand,
denying the wronged litigant relief altogether, or the court will take the case
away from the jury entirely by granting summary judgment.97 Both results
are problematic.
This Part discusses the evolution of the doctrine in both federal and state
court and explores how and why the normal processes that bend toward
procedural uniformity failed to gain significant convergence in how judges
review the weight of the evidence after a jury verdict. There are three
converging trends that lead to an overall impression of doctrinal disorder.
First, an historical lack of appellate review in the federal court system meant
that there was less standardization and the new-trial remedy became
under-utilized.98 Second, although the states made much more robust use of
the new-trial remedy, the lack of a unified federal approach meant that what
93
Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 625 (Tex. 2004). Texas courts use the term “factual
sufficiency review” to refer to weight-of-the-evidence challenges. See W. Wendell Hall et al., Hall’s
Standards of Review in Texas, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 3, 28 (2010) (“[T]he less deferential ‘factual
sufficiency’ standard . . . permits the court to consider the weight of the evidence.”).
94
Redmond v. Socha, 837 N.E.2d 883, 900 (Ill. 2005) (quoting Maple v. Gustafson, 603 N.E.2d
508, 511–12 (Ill. 1992)).
95
See supra Part I.
96
Robertson, supra note 21, at 172 (“Perhaps because federal courts so rarely apply the new-trial
remedy on the weight of the evidence, they often overlook the very existence of such a remedy.”).
97
In some cases, the court may rely on summary judgment or judgment as a matter law, thereby
cutting out the jury entirely, rather than applying a lesser standard of review and granting a new trial on
the weight of the evidence. See id. at 188. (“If the rule authorizing new trials on the weight of the evidence
is not to be superfluous, then the standard for granting a new trial cannot be as strict as the standard for
granting judgment as a matter of law.”).
98
See infra Section II.A.
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Professor Scott Dodson has called the “federal law’s gravitational effect”99
could not draw the varying states closer together, and the different state
approaches diverged greatly over the last two-and-a-half centuries.100
Finally, the changing relationship between appellate courts and trial
courts—especially on matters of trial judge discretion—has complicated the
underlying analysis.101
A. The Historical Lack of Appellate Review in Federal Court
In federal court, weight-of-the-evidence review remains vastly underutilized as compared to its presence in the state courts. This is likely due, at
least in part, to the historical limitation on appellate oversight in the federal
courts. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court held that the Seventh
Amendment’s Re-Examination Clause prevented appellate courts from
reviewing the trial judge’s decision to grant or deny a new trial on the weight
of the evidence.102 As a result, trial judges applied very different standards
to decide whether and when to grant a new trial on the weight of the
evidence.
Ordinarily, appellate review of lower court judgments serves a
standardizing function.103 This is not just a matter of articulating consistent
rules. Instead, appellate courts do more than simply resolve disputes about
the proper rule to be applied; they promote uniformity in how legal rules are
applied to particular factual situations.104 This role is particularly important
in delimiting the scope of the district court’s discretion.105 Without such a
standardizing influence, litigants become less able to predict the outcome of
their cases and their trust in the judicial system diminishes.106

99

Dodson, supra note 36, at 752.
See infra Section II.B.
101
See infra Section II.C.
102
United States v. Laub, 37 U.S. 1, 5 (1838).
103
Robertson, supra note 36, at 1224–25 (“Legal scholars have identified a number of different
functions that a robust appellate system serves, including correcting legal and factual errors; encouraging
the development and refinement of legal principles; increasing uniformity and standardization in the
application of legal rules; and promoting respect for the rule of law.”).
104
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: A
Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733, 771 (2006) [hereinafter
Robertson, Appellate Review]; see also Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens on Appeal:
The Case for Interlocutory Review, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 445, 455 (2012) [hereinafter Robertson, Forum
Non Conveniens] (“The classic remedy for inconsistent application of the law is appellate review.”).
105
Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 635, 638, 641 (1971) (explaining that appellate review can help define what types of
discretionary decisions are “decision liberating,” where the judge has full freedom to decide, and which
types of decisions are “review limiting,” where there may be law constraining the trial court’s decision,
but there will be [almost] no appellate review of that decision).
106
See Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 104, at 455 (“When plaintiffs’ access to an
effective remedy is inconsistent, unpredictable, and varies according to seemingly random geographic
districts, parties will lose trust in the system and in the rule of law more broadly.”).
100
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Without the standardizing effect of appellate review, the historical
insulation of the trial judge’s decision meant that the standards for review
were never clearly articulated. As a result, attorneys and courts alike often
failed to distinguish between weight-of-the-evidence and sufficiency-of-theevidence challenges.107 In the absence of clearly articulated grounds for
granting a new trial on the weight of the evidence, parties often failed to
raise the issue in federal court—even appellees who alleged a complete lack
of evidence to support the jury’s verdict and sought entry of a directed
verdict often failed to raise the easier claim that the manifest weight of the
evidence contradicted the verdict and thus necessitated a new trial.108
At the same time, two parallel movements in the federal courts helped
to obscure the under-utilization of the new-trial remedy. First, parties more
often accepted remedies short of a jury trial. Civil claims were more often
settled, and criminal cases more often resulted in a plea bargain.109 Second,
there was a significant growth in the use of involuntary dismissal. The
“summary judgment trilogy” of cases made it easier for civil defendants to
obtain a favorable judgment without going to trial.110 As lawyers and judges
saw jury trials less frequently, there were fewer opportunities to raise the
claim that the jury’s verdict contradicted the weight of the evidence.
In 1996, the Supreme Court reversed course and held that the appellate
courts could review the trial judge’s decision for an abuse of discretion.111
The Supreme Court’s decision to make rulings on the weight of the evidence
reviewable on appeal represented a further step in the “dramatic” shift in the
law from earlier restrictions on judicial review of verdicts.112 At the time
Gasperini was decided, some onlookers expected that appellate review of
107
Robertson, supra note 21, at 172 (“This confusion is not limited to the attorneys who may
overlook weight points when they draft their appeal. Instead, appellate courts sometimes overlook
weight-of-the-evidence points even when a party clearly raises such a point of appeal. Courts have treated
such arguments instead as sufficiency points, seeming to ignore their own precedent about the difference
between weight and sufficiency.”). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, at § 2806 n.7 (“There are . .
. a few cases that have confused the standard on a new-trial motion with that on a directed-verdict
motion.”).
108
See Robertson, supra note 21, at 170 (finding that, in a one-year period, federal appellate courts
considered weight-of-the-evidence points in less than one hundred cases and evidentiary sufficiency in
more than a thousand cases).
109
See Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 NW. U.L.
REV. 995, 1018 (1994) (“In addition to the growth of ADR, more and more cases are resolved pretrial by
settlements and pleas. . . . [F]ewer and fewer cases are actually being tried.”).
110
See Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment
Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 82–83 (2006) (“Collectively, the
trilogy is viewed as a ‘celebration of summary judgment’ and a mandate for federal courts to embrace
the use of summary judgment to dispose of cases before trial.” (quoting Stephen Calkins, Summary
Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System,
74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1114–15 (1986))). The “trilogy” refers to Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) and Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
111
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 435 (1996).
112
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, at § 2819.
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the weight of the evidence would become commonplace in federal court, as
it is in a number of states.113
In the twenty years since Gasperini, however, trial judge decisions on
the weight of the evidence are still appealed far less often in federal court
than they are in most state courts. The federal circuit courts of appeals
typically reverse just over 2,000 judgments each year, but only a handful of
those reversals—less than 0.5 percent—are based on the weight of the
evidence.114 In Texas, by contrast, where the right to review is much more
systematized, 4 percent of reversals are based on the weight of the
evidence.115
B. The Missing Gravitational Pull of Federal Procedure
The Texas position is not entirely unusual among the state courts, though
it does have a better-developed procedure to review weight-of-the-evidence
challenges than most states.116 In general, state courts are more comfortable
with weight-of the-evidence review than are federal courts. Even though
state constitutions typically protected the right to a jury trial, they did not
include re-examination clauses similar to the federal one. As a result, the
states allowed a consistent history of appellate review.117 To the extent that
the states had any limit on appellate review of jury verdicts at all, they tended
to give the intermediate appellate courts the exclusive power to review the
“factual sufficiency” or “manifest weight” of the evidence.118 As a result, the
state standards for granting new trials are better developed and much more

113
See Donald F. Paine, Paine on Procedure: Federal Judges As 13th Jurors, TENN. B.J. 20, 32
(1999) (expecting that in the aftermath of Gasperini, “weight of evidence motions will become routine”
in federal court).
114
Robertson, supra note 21, at 171.
115
Id. at 169–70. Texas jurisprudence refers to verdicts contrary to the great weight of the evidence
as “factually insufficient,” as opposed to the “legal insufficiency” that would support a directed verdict.
116
See Hall et al., supra note 93, at 40–43 (2010) (providing an overview of factual sufficiency
review); W. Wendell Hall & Mark Emery, The Texas Hold Out: Trends in the Review of Civil and
Criminal Jury Verdicts, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 539, 605–06 (2008) (describing “Texas’ heritage as a dualstandard state” where both factual and legal sufficiency review have a well-developed history).
117
See Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights to
Civil Jury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 871 (2014) (“Language similar to the first clause of
the Seventh Amendment, the Preservation Clause, was ubiquitous in state constitutions. The second
clause, the Re-examination Clause, was unique to the Federal Constitution.”).
118
See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (providing that judgments of the intermediate courts of appeals
in Texas “shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on appeal or error,” a clause
that has been interpreted to mean that weight-of-the-evidence points can be raised in the intermediate
appellate courts but not in the Supreme Court); State v. Moore, 689 N.E.2d 1, 18 (Ohio 1998) (“This
court does not ordinarily evaluate the manifest weight of the evidence in cases evaluated by the courts of
appeals.”); Liska v. Chicago Rys. Co., 149 N.E. 469, 476 (Ill. 1925) (“The provisions of the Practice Act
that judgments of the Appellate Court shall be final as to all matters of fact in controversy in actions at
law are not unconstitutional, because the right of trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution does not
include the right to a review of the facts by this court.”).
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commonly applied than the federal standards, and the new-trial remedy is
not under-utilized in state court to the same extent that it is in federal court.119
Even though new trials on the weight of the evidence may be granted
more often in state court, however, there is still significant disagreement
about the role that weight-of-the-evidence review should play within the
overall framework of the state justice system, and disagreement—both
within and among states—about the standards to be applied in reviewing
jury verdicts.120 This divergence is not, by itself, problematic; the states, after
all, have their own procedural rules appropriate for their own
circumstances.121 But it is nevertheless significant, as a unified federal
procedure generally exerts a significant “gravitational pull” on state
practice.122
Federal procedure in other areas—including the adoption of the federal
rules in general,123 the expansion of summary judgment practice
thereafter,124 and more recently (though perhaps to a lesser degree) with

119
See, e.g., People v. Cahill, 809 N.E.2d 561, 583–84 (N.Y. 2003) (noting that in New York, the
Court of Appeals applies weight-of-the-evidence review in death-penalty cases, which are appealed
directly to the highest court, and the intermediate courts routinely conduct weight-of-the-evidence review
in other cases); York v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 854 N.E.2d 635, 652–53 (Ill. 2006)
(citing Maple v. Gustafson, 603 N.E.2d 508 (1992)) (“A new trial should be granted only when the
verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. . . . A reviewing court will not reverse a circuit
court’s decision with respect to a motion for a new trial unless it finds that the circuit court abused its
discretion.”); State v. Scott, 800 N.E.2d 1133, 1140 (Ohio 2004) (“[A] challenge to the sufficiency of
evidence is different from a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence.”); Lynne Liberato & Kent
Rutter, Reasons for Reversal in the Texas Courts of Appeals, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 431, 436–38, 462 (2003)
(showing that Texas appeals courts reverse one in three rulings).
120
See supra Part II.
121
See Dodson, supra note 36, at 707 (“In the post-1938 world, federal and state courts
independently develop and apply their own procedures. . . . Thus, states are free to adopt their own rules
of procedure, and state courts are free to interpret their state rules independently of federal rules and
federal judicial opinions.”); see also Joseph A. Wickes, The New Rule-Making Power of the United States
Supreme Court, 13 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 8 (1934) (explaining how the ABA’s creation of a Committee on
Uniform Judicial Procedure came about as a response to the “utter failure of the Conformity Act to bring
about uniformity in federal and state procedure in civil cases”).
122
Dodson, supra note 36, at 710 (“In every state, federal rulemakers have exerted an extraordinary
gravitational pull on state rulemakers.”).
123
John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court
Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1427 (1986) (finding that approximately half of
American states had based their procedural rules almost entirely on the federal rules, and that even in the
other states, the federal rules had been highly influential).
124
Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of IntraState Uniformity in Three States that Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL.
L. REV. 311, 328–29 (2001) (noting the influence of federal summary-judgment practice on the states).
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125

“plausibility” pleading —encouraged the convergence of state practice.126
States tended to at least consider the adoption of federal procedural rules,
and even when a state opted not to follow the federal rule, judicial
explanations of the decision to diverge from federal practice helped clarify
the contours of, and reasons for, the continued application of a differing state
practice.127
But with regard to new trials on the weight of the evidence, there has
been no push for convergence among the states. The evolving application of
the rule over two-and-a-half centuries has led to a significantly different
application of the practice.128 As described earlier, new trials on the weight
of the evidence date back at least to the time of Blackstone, and were
ingrained in the founding of the states.129 Given the tremendous changes that
have occurred over the last two-and-a-half centuries, in society in general as
well as in the justice system in particular, it is not surprising that the law and
doctrine surrounding the new-trial motion would face significant evolution
in the states.
Without the influence of a standard federal-court approach, there has
been little attention paid to the divergence of state standards. It is rare for
state courts to refer to decisions of other states in developing or applying the
standards by which they review the weight of the evidence after a jury
trial.130 The divergences expand over time and run deep: in addition to
differences in nomenclature, states disagree about the same fundamental
aspects of the standard that have caused fractures in federal practice,
including the degree of “wrongness” of the jury’s verdict, whether the trial
judge should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s
125

See Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great Split Between Federal
and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/tremorsof-things-to-come-the-great-split-between-federal-and-state-pleading-standards (“[T]he splintering of
pleading standards in the wake of Iqbal has the potential to usher in a new era of procedural diversity.”);
Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural
Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1470 (2008) (“The Twombly decision presents Conley states with
perhaps the most critical civil procedure decision since they chose to adopt the Federal Rules.”).
126
Dodson, supra note 36, at 710.
127
This process is occurring now as states consider whether to adopt the federal “plausibility
pleading” framework found in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly. See, e.g., Warne v. Hall,
373 P.3d 588, 595 (Colo. 2016) (“Because we understand our prior cases as reflecting the merit of
interpreting our rules of civil pleading harmoniously with the corresponding federal rules, wherever that
can be accomplished without violating our own interpretative rules or interfering with important state
policy, and because we find the interpretative gloss added by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal
to be very much in line with the direction our rule-making has taken and the current needs of the civil
justice system in this jurisdiction, we join those other states already embracing the plausibility standard
articulated in those cases as a statement of the pleading requirements of their own analogs to Federal
Rule 8.”); Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 424 (Tenn. 2011) (“We
decline to adopt the new Twombly/Iqbal ‘plausibility’ pleading standard and affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.”).
128
See supra Parts II.B–C.
129
See supra Part I.
130
See supra Section I.A.
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verdict, and whether the trial judge can independently assess witness
credibility. However, the longer history of appellate standardization within
(though not among) the individual states causes the state differences to be
more entrenched and less likely to result from confusion or unfamiliarity
with the governing standard.131
C. The Changing Appellate Court View of Deference and Discretion
A compounding factor that inhibits uniformity in both state and federal
courts is the changing relationship of appellate courts and trial courts over
the last half century. As appellate review has grown in importance, appellate
courts’ deference to the trial court has diminished.132 Interestingly, this shift
occurred even as the trial judge’s role grew overall; as judges took a notably
more “managerial” role in the pretrial and trial process—especially in
pushing the parties toward settlement.133 But at the same time as the trial
judge grew more powerful in relation to the parties and their lawyers, the
trial judge also faced more exacting appellate scrutiny.134
In federal court, this changing relationship was largely obscured by the
pre-Gasperini reluctance of appellate courts to review weight-of-theevidence decisions.135 But in the post-Gasperini era in federal court—and in
the state courts more generally—appellate scrutiny of weight-of-theevidence challenges has grown increasingly complex as appellate review has
taken a larger role in the justice system as a whole. This has led to even
greater doctrinal disorder in the federal courts, as the passage of two decades
since Gasperini has not been enough time for the appellate courts to offer
greater standardization. The states have taken a more organized approach,
but it is nevertheless an approach that has evolved toward giving the

131

See Lerner, supra note 117, at 828 (noting that the state constitutions did not contain a provision
paralleling the Re-Examination Clause).
132
See Robertson, supra note 36, at 1237–38 (explaining that “[i]n the early days of the United
States, the right to appellate review was significantly limited,” and tracing the growth of appellate
remedies).
133
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–77 (1982) (“In growing numbers,
judges are not only adjudicating the merits of issues presented to them by litigants, but also are meeting
with parties in chambers to encourage settlement of disputes and to supervise case preparation.”).
134
Samuel P. Jordan, Irregular Panels, 60 ALA. L. REV. 547, 576 (2009) (“The federal appellate
caseload has increased dramatically in the last fifty years, and the increase in the number of judges
authorized to decide those cases has not come close to keeping pace. As a result, the number of
dispositions per judge has increased steadily over time, giving rise to concerns about the effect of judicial
strain on the quality of justice delivered by the federal appellate system.” (footnote omitted)).
135
See supra Section II.A; see also United States v. Laub, 12 U.S. 1, 5 (1838) (“[I]t is a point too
well settled to be now drawn in question, that the effect and sufficiency of the evidence, are for the
consideration and determination of the jury; and the error is to be redressed, if at all, by application to
the court below for a new trial, and cannot be made a ground of objection on a writ of error.”); WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 45, at § 2819 (tracing the history of federal appellate review of weight-of-the-evidence
challenges).
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appellate court a greater role in assessing weight-of-the-evidence
challenges.136
The role of appellate review has grown significantly in the modern
era.137 At the time of the founding, trials were the predominant way to
resolve cases.138 Under this system, both judges and juries had a significant
role. The jury would hear evidence, pass judgment on witness credibility,
and resolve questions of fact.139 The judge could exercise significant
discretion in instructing the jury before the start of deliberations and in
ordering a new trial upon disagreement with the jury’s verdict.140 Appellate
courts had only a very limited role in correcting legal error.141
Over time, appellate courts began more closely scrutinizing the exercise
of trial court discretion.142 Some scholars supported this trend, suggesting
that when the appellate court has access to the same record evidence as the
trial court, there is little, if any, reason to defer to the trial judge’s decision.143
However, as the scope of appellate review expanded into areas traditionally
reserved for the jury,144 other academic commentators expressed concern

136

See infra Section II.C.
See Robertson, supra note 36, at 1237–38 (discussing the highly restricted right to appellate
review in the early days of American jurisprudence).
138
Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 873, 873 (2002) (“The
civil jury is virtually the only Anglo-American adjudicatory device to have functioned serviceably for
more than 900 years. Its long history reflects not the endurance of a sanctified relic but the adaptability
of a decision-making mechanism that affords society substantial and unique benefits.”).
139
Id. at 874 (“By the middle of the fourteenth century, however, the English had adopted
procedures which made it clear that the jury was not simply a collection of witnesses, but a deliberative
body. . . . [T]he jury gradually shifted from reliance on its own knowledge to dependence on the testimony
of witnesses in open court. The jury was thus transformed into an evaluator of proofs.”).
140
Id. at 888 (“[U]ndoubtedly, new trials had a role to play in mid-eighteenth century English
courtrooms. . . . The new trial mechanism thus imported into American practice was one vested in the
trial court to overturn a clearly unjust decision. It was to be employed to set the stage for the submission
of the case to a second jury.”).
141
See id. at 889 (“During the nineteenth century, appellate court judges were not permitted to
consider the question of new trials.”); see also Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making
Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury
Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C.L. REV. 993, 1000 (1986) (“The only exception to free
review of questions of law is in the area of administrative law, in which appellate courts occasionally
defer to agency declarations of general legal principles.”).
142
See Louis, supra note 141, at 999 (noting that “[a]ppellate courts today more readily find abuses
of procedural discretion”).
143
See Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 184 (1978)
(“When the appellate court has as much before it as the trial judge did, and when the matter is not one of
those issues in which the circumstances are so diffuse that no rule or standard can be fashioned, the
appellate court should not defer to the trial judge’s choice in the absence of some particular and cogent
reason for doing so.”).
144
See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (noting that the Supreme Court justices had
viewed a video of the police chase that gave rise to the case, and concluding based on that viewing that
“no reasonable jury” could have believed the plaintiff’s account of the case); David Kessler, Justices in
the Jury Box: Video Evidence and Summary Judgment in Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007), 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423, 434–35 (2008) (“Harris raises the concern that the seductive quality of
video evidence may lead courts to conclude too quickly that genuine issues of material fact are absent,
thereby usurping the jury’s fact-finding role. The precedent set by Harris allows appellate courts to
decide more cases involving video evidence during summary judgment.”).
137
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about this expansion, especially when that appellate review increased the
overall scrutiny given to jury verdicts.145
By the time the Supreme Court ruled in Gasperini that appellate courts
could review new trial rulings on the weight of the evidence for “abuse of
discretion,” that very concept was in the middle of a transition, as appellate
courts were more closely scrutinizing trial court discretion in other areas.146
The lack of earlier appellate systematization already clouded the scope of
the trial judge’s discretion to grant a new trial. Now, there was a
compounding factor: once appellate courts started to review trial judges’
rulings on evidentiary weight, how should an appellate court determine
whether a trial court had abused its discretion?
Unsurprisingly, federal courts have split over the question of how much
deference to give to trial court decisions granting or denying a motion for a
new trial and what exactly an “abuse of discretion” looks like in this
context.147 Courts generally agree that a trial court abuses its discretion by
stating and applying the wrong standard.148 But if the trial court believed the
jury’s verdict to be against the weight of the evidence, and therefore granted
a new trial, and the appellate court disagrees, does that necessarily mean that
the trial court abused its discretion?149 What if the trial court refused to grant
a new trial, and the appellate court concludes that the jury’s verdict was
against the great weight of the evidence?150 On these points, the federal
circuits continue to disagree.151 The state courts, by contrast, tend to be more
145
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 904 (2009) (“There were multiple avenues
available to the Court for reversing in Scott, we have suggested. But the justification it chose was the one
that maximized the experience of exclusion for a recognizable segment of the American citizenry,
needlessly infusing the decision with culturally partisan overtones that detracted from the law’s
legitimacy.”); Andrew S. Pollis, The Death of Inference, 55 B.C.L. REV. 435, 474–75 (2014) (“[J]udicial
encroachment on the jury’s role in drawing inferences violates an important tenet of our judicial system:
ensuring that disputes are resolved by a group of people whose diverse attributes and experiences
accurately reflect the community.” (footnote omitted)).
146
See Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV.
751, 758–63 (1957) (charting the rise of appellate scrutiny of trial court rulings and expressing a preGasperini concern that appellate courts improperly reviewing decisions to grant or deny a new trial on
the weight of the evidence).
147
See Robertson, supra note 21, at 197–99 (noting that some federal courts apply an abuse of
discretion standard very close to de novo review, while others will review the decision to grant a new
trial more strictly than the decision to deny it, and that some courts have issued conflicting opinions
without noting the different standards).
148
See, e.g., Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 773 F.2d 592, 595 (4th Cir. 1985) (reversing
judgments in which the district court had misstated the standard for reviewing the weight of the
evidence); Williams v. Nichols, 266 F.2d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 1959) (same).
149
See, e.g., Urti v. Transp. Commercial Corp., 479 F.2d 766, 770 (5th Cir. 1973) (overturning the
refusal to grant a new trial); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 264 F.2d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 1959)
(same).
150
See Robertson, supra note 21, at 197–99 (explaining that some circuits will give greater
deference to a trial court’s denial of a new trial than to the grant of a new trial).
151
Compare Bank of Am., N.A. v. JB Hanna, LLC, 766 F.3d 841, 851 (8th Cir. 2014) (“We
conclude that the district court committed a clear abuse of discretion by denying the Bank’s motion for
a new trial, because the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.”), with Baker v. Dorfman,
239 F.3d 415, 422 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A] district court deni[al] [of] a motion for a new trial made on the
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comfortable with appellate review of the trial court’s decision. In part, this
comfort level may stem from the fact that state courts have not historically
been forbidden from reviewing the weight of the evidence.152
Perhaps as a result, states have developed mechanisms to assist in that
review—typically, by requiring the trial judge to explain the decision to
grant a new trial, even requiring a detailed explanation of the evidence
supporting or contradicting the verdict.153 Indiana, for example, requires that
the trial judge explain why he or she is granting a new trial. A judge who
grants a new trial on the weight of the evidence must detail the evidence
supporting and opposing the jury’s verdict and must explain why the new
trial is warranted.154 The Supreme Court of Indiana has held that “[i]t is
compliance with the arduous and time-consuming requirements of the Rule
which provides assurance to the parties and the courts that the judge’s
evaluation of the evidence is better than the evaluation of the jury.”155
Georgia likewise suggests a need for the trial judge to explain the decision,
or at least to specifically state that the court had “exercise[d] its discretion”
by independently weighing the evidence in response to a motion for a new
trial.156 These procedures help clarify the role of appellate court review in
the state courts. Unfortunately, no real parallel exists in the federal system.157
III. CURING INVISIBLE ERROR IN THE ERA OF THE VANISHING TRIAL
As a result of the judicial divergence and doctrinal disorder described
above, trial judges across the judicial system have been unable to
consistently review unjust jury verdicts and correct for invisible error hiding
behind a veil of deliberative secrecy.158 The power to order a new trial on
the weight of the evidence arose long ago, when jury trials were the legal
system’s dominant mode of resolving cases. In the modern era, increased
ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence . . . is not reviewable on appeal.” (quoting
Dailey v. Societe Generale, 108 F.3d 451, 458 (2d Cir. 1997)). But see Hughes v. Town of Bethlehem,
No. 15-1758-CV, 2016 WL 1129993, at *3 n.1 (2d Cir. Mar. 23, 2016) (noting that the Second Circuit
had been inconsistent in forbidding appellate review of the denial of a new trial on the weight of the
evidence).
152
Federal courts, on the other hand, could not review such rulings until 1996. Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436 (1996).
153
See, e.g., In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, LP, 290 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex.
2009) (“We direct the trial court to specify its reasons for disregarding the jury’s verdict and granting a
new trial, to the extent it did so . . . .”).
154
IND. R. TRIAL P. 59(J) (“[I]f the decision is found to be against the weight of the evidence, the
findings shall relate the supporting and opposing evidence to each issue upon which a new trial is granted
. . . .”).
155
Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat’l Bank, 358 N.E.2d 974, 978 (Ind. 1976).
156
Gomillion v. State, 769 S.E.2d 914, 916 (Ga. 2015).
157
See Robertson, supra note 21, at 211–12 (arguing that trial courts should do more to explain
their rulings when granting or denying a new trial); see also Stafford v. Neurological Med., Inc., 811
F.2d 470, 474 (8th Cir. 1987) (“A district court does not properly exercise its discretionary authority
when it fails to articulate the analysis utilized to justify upsetting a jury’s verdict.”).
158
See supra Parts II & III.
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appellate scrutiny of trial court rulings has created an opportunity for a more
systematized review of new-trial motions.159 Even as other forms of judicial
power increased—including a trend toward “managerial judging,” which
expanded the trial judge’s sphere of authority—weight-of-the-evidence
review has continued to be treated as an afterthought in federal court and as
a local quirk of procedure in state court.160
At the same time as appellate scrutiny of trial rulings has increased,
however, the overall number of trials (especially jury trials) has markedly
decreased.161 Jury trials have gone from relatively rare to an endangered
species.162 The ABA’s “Vanishing Trial” has documented the decline in jury
trials over the last half-century, finding that by the early part of the
twenty-first century, less than 2 percent of civil cases in federal court (and
less than 1 percent of civil cases in state court) ever get to trial.163 On the
criminal side, approximately 2 percent of felony cases go to trial; the rate is
even lower for misdemeanors.164
Given the modern rarity of jury trials, it may seem superfluous and
inefficient to allow not just one trial, but two. This is especially true in light
of evidence that juries typically exercise their responsibilities faithfully, and
reach the same result as the judge would have reached in approximately
78 percent of both civil and criminal cases.165 Courts know that juries
generally reach the right result, and even when a jury verdict might
reasonably be questioned, judges often express a need to protect the jury’s
verdict against intrusion from above.166 The Sixth Circuit, for example, has
cautioned that when a trial judge decides to grant a new trial on the weight
of the evidence without a finding that the jury process was tainted by an
“undesirable or pernicious element,” the judge thereby “effects a denigration
of the jury system” and potentially usurps the jury’s role.167
Unfortunately, however, deliberative secrecy means that the judge may
not have seen or known that such an “undesirable or pernicious element”
had influenced the jury’s decision. What if the juror’s statements in
Peña-Rodriguez had never come to light? The judge would never have
159

See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section III.A.
161
See Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C.L. REV. 1777, 1807 (2015) (“Even when
trials were thought to be the norm, the rate of actual trials ranged from 12–20%.”).
162
Id.
163
Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, ABA LITIG. J., Winter 2004, at 1–2.
164
See M. Clara Garcia Hernandez & Carole J. Powell, Valuing Gideon’s Gold: How Much Justice
Can We Afford?, 122 YALE L.J. 2358, 2364 (2013) (noting that “[o]ur trial rate the past two years has
been 1.1% for felonies, and less than 0.5% for misdemeanors,” which was somewhat lower than the 2.3
percent felony trial rate reported in a study of nine states).
165
VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 18, at 148–51.
166
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 45, § 2806.
167
Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1047 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Static Control
Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 2d 542, 550 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (using the same
language as appears in Holmes).
160
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known that pure racial bias was injected into the jury’s decision, though that
is as “undesirable or pernicious” an element as one can imagine. As a result,
even in this era of the vanishing trial, the trial judge’s power to review the
weight of the evidence remains an important structural safeguard of the trial
process.
In the absence of the traditional factors pushing toward procedural
standardization, doctrinal coherence requires that courts work harder to
adopt a coherent theory of the new-trial remedy and its role in protecting due
process. As Professor Gregory Sisk has observed in academic legal research,
“theory provides the context,” showing what is worthy of further study and
offering guidance in “interpreting what has been observed.”168 In the absence
of a history of federal appellate attention guiding the exercise of the trial
judge’s discretion, it becomes even more important to explicitly articulate
the goals and purposes of the trial judge’s power to review the weight of the
evidence. This Part examines the two largest functions of that review:
protecting the deliberative process and promoting decisional accuracy. It
concludes that these functions are significant enough that the trial judge’s
authority to review evidentiary weight should be afforded procedural due
process protection.
A. Protecting the Deliberative Process
Is deliberative secrecy even worth the risk of jury misconduct or error?
In general, restrictions on jury secrecy, as well as Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b)’s prohibition on allowing jurors to impeach their own verdict, forbid
the court from inquiring into the basis of the jury’s decision.169 Allowing
greater communication between judge and jury would seem to alleviate
many of the grounds for error within the jury process. Without a strict rule
protecting deliberative secrecy, attorneys could inquire whether the jurors
improperly based their decisions on matters outside the evidence. And
certainly, some limits on deliberative secrecy may be desirable, necessary,
and even constitutionally required.170 At oral argument in the
Peña-Rodriguez case, the Court questioned the attorneys extensively about
various state rules that make an exception to deliberative secrecy in order to
allow evidence of racial bias or animus. Both the justices and the attorneys
arguing the case struggled to draw a line between the defendant’s right to a
168

Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of
Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 891 (2008) (reviewing “Decision Making in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals” by Frank B. Cross).
169
FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (providing that “a juror may not testify about any statement made or
incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another
juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment”).
170
Transcript of Oral Argument at 40–41, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1513 (2016)
(No. 15-606), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
2016/15-606_5iel.pdf.
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jury trial free of racial bias and the tradition of jury secrecy. Ultimately,
the Court drew a line that allowed inquiry into juror deliberation only for
cases of racial bias (not for other types of bias or misconduct) and only when
that racial bias was “overt.”172 There are few cases that meet both of these
requirements; as the justices pointed out in oral argument, Peña-Rodriguez
is a highly unusual case.
As a result, courts will continue to struggle to reconcile due process
protection with the policies behind jury secrecy. These goals are not always
in opposition. Rule 606(b) was enacted to protect due process by
encouraging full and open deliberation among jurors. In general,
encouraging free and open deliberation is essential to the jury process. If
jurors self-censor, hiding the thoughts that motivate their ultimate votes in
the jury room, then the deliberative process cannot work effectively. As the
Texas Supreme Court stated in an earlier case raising issues of juror secrecy:
[J]ury deliberations must be kept private to encourage jurors
to candidly discuss the case. A verdict is a collaborative effort
requiring individuals from different backgrounds to reach a
consensus. A juror should feel free to raise and consider an
unpopular viewpoint. To discharge their duties effectively,
jurors must be able to discuss the evidence and issues without
fear that their deliberations will later be held up to public
scrutiny.173
These rules protect the jury’s independence and reflect “the determination
that the value of deliberative secrecy outweighs the risk that some juror
misconduct during deliberations will be beyond the court’s power to
remedy.”174
In particular, the advisory committee notes to Rule 606 provide that the
practice of forbidding juror impeachment evidence promotes other factors
beyond the “freedom of deliberation,” including both the “finality of
verdicts,” and “protection of jurors against annoyance.”175 These
considerations are important; if juror-impeachment evidence were freely
available, a losing litigant would have every incentive to question the jurors
after the verdict, seeking not just information to help improve their trial
technique for future trials (as lawyers may do even now176), but seeking to
171

Id.
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
173
Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362, 367 (Tex. 2000).
174
Courselle, supra note 19, at 219.
175
FED. R. EVID. 606 advisory committee’s note to 1972 amendment.
176
Amanda R. Wolin, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room . . . but Should It?:
A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 60 UCLA L. REV. 262,
294 (2012) (explaining that “the Rule’s prohibition only bars a juror from conveying testimony in court,
but it does not prohibit jurors from speaking to other people,” and noting that jurors may voluntarily
speak with the attorneys or others after the verdict has been issued).
172
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discredit the jurors themselves. Even under the current system, where
post-trial contact with jurors is entirely voluntary (and information learned
from such interviews is inadmissible), jurors report feeling intruded upon
and pressured by inquiries from the parties and the media.177 It is not clear
that the jury system could survive the pressure and scrutiny that would be
applied by attorneys seeking to uncover error in the jury process.
Furthermore, improper jury decision-making is not always a one-way
street. Certainly, in some cases (as in Peña-Rodriguez’s case) an improper
jury verdict comes from outside the evidence—more specifically, from
considering extraneous, irrelevant, or inadmissible factors. However, this
failure in jury deliberations is also associated with an evidentiary
presentation that fails to meet overall confidence levels—that is, if the jurors
are not confident that the evidence as a whole is strong enough to reach a
firm belief, they may turn to other proxies in arriving at their decision.178
Of course, this emphasis on juror privacy and independence does not
mean that jury misconduct is not a problem, and it certainly does not mean
that juror misconduct that infects a verdict should go un-remedied. But even
if, as seems likely, the Supreme Court rules that a juror’s overt racial
discrimination violated the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the underlying
structural problems remain. There are still many other types of jury behavior
that are also problematic, even if they do not rise to the level of racial
discrimination.179 And even racially biased decision-making itself will not
always be apparent; in many cases, it may fly under the radar, unapparent to
the judge or to the parties, but still influencing the ultimate verdict. If the
threat was only one of racism, better pretrial screening of venire members
might minimize the risk of a biased jury and reduce the pressure to inquire
into deliberations.180 But as one observer has noted, “cases involving
177
David Weinstein, Protecting A Juror’s Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and Policy
Options, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1997) (“Jurors do not volunteer for service; they are compelled, on
pain of contempt, to perform their necessary function . . . . [O]pinion surveys have found invasion of
privacy to be a frequent complaint registered by jurors about their service.”).
178
Id.; see also Charles L. Barzun, Rules of Weight, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957, 1963 (2008)
(recommending the use of “rules of weight” to reduce the harm of juror reliance on heuristics and biases);
Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH. L. REV. 241, 244–
45 (2006) (explaining that decision heuristics may help explain why juries overvalue direct evidence and
undervalue circumstantial evidence); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts:
Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 93 (2000) (discussing hindsight bias and the
“representativeness heuristic,” and noting that judges can better identify errors in jury decision making).
179
At oral argument, the Court raised the possibility that jurors might simply toss a coin to decide
a verdict. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1513 (2016) (No.
15-606), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/15-606_5iel.pdf.
Such a procedure would be fundamentally arbitrary, but it would not be addressed by a narrow rule that
allowed evidence of improper decision-making only when allegations of racial bias were raised.
180
See Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men: Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias, 27 HARV. J. RACIAL
& ETHNIC JUST. 165, 169 (2011) (“By honestly and systematically acknowledging, addressing, and
excising juror biases prior to deliberation, overt acts of bias during deliberations, and the consequent
pressure to carve a broad exception to the evidentiary prohibition, can be reduced.”).
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affirmative misconduct by jurors are legion in number and variety.” There
are many other prejudices and irrationalities that can come into play, and no
way to predict them all ahead of time.182
Therefore, even though overt racial discrimination is carved out as an
exception to the general rule that jury-room evidence is inadmissible, there
is a need for the trial judge to take an active role in reviewing the weight of
the evidence after a jury verdict. Logic suggests that a verdict tainted by
prejudice, stereotypes, and extraneous, irrelevant information runs a higher
risk of not being supported by the evidence. After all, if the evidence alone
were strong enough to support the ruling, jurors would not need to look
elsewhere for arguments to buttress their position. Because the judge cannot
directly find out why the jury ruled as it did—and cannot ask directly
whether the jury engaged in improper decision-making—allowing the judge
to make an independent assessment that the verdict was against the great
weight of the evidence acts as a safety valve. It allows the trial judge to grant
a new trial “when the judge believes, but does not know for certain, that the
jury based its verdict on something other than a rational review of the
evidence.”183 In this way, the jury’s independence is maintained, but the
party subjected to a potentially unjust verdict may still seek relief from the
trial court.
B. Promoting Decisional Accuracy
Perhaps the most important reason for the judge to review evidentiary
weight is the goal of obtaining a higher level of accuracy—and thus, a higher
level of confidence in the result of the judicial process. It is true that at the
time the practice was adopted there were serious deficiencies in the jury
process that left open a need for further review. Courts in the Blackstonian
era, for example, would forbid jurors from eating or drinking until they were
able to reach a verdict—which had the perverse result that verdicts were
more likely to reflect the wishes of those who were physically strongest,
rather than those who could persuade the others through logic or reason.184
181

Edward T. Swaine, Note, Pre-Deliberations Juror Misconduct, Evidential Incompetence, and
Juror Responsibility, 98 YALE L.J. 187, 190 (1988) (citing instances of intoxication, sleeping through
testimony, and undisclosed conflicts of interest).
182
Lee Goldman, Post-Verdict Challenges to Racial Comments Made During Juror Deliberations,
61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 19 (2010) (“[I]n a case where a defendant testifies on her own behalf, comments
such as, ‘I don’t trust anyone with beady eyes,’ or, ‘What difference does it make if the defendant is
guilty, he is a bad guy,’ seem to demonstrate partiality or unfairness as much as [statements particularly
referencing race].”).
183
Robertson, supra note 21, at 161.
184
Blackstone criticized the practice, writing: “The jury are to give their opinion instanter, that is
before they separate, eat or drink, and under these circumstances the most intelligent and best intentioned
may bring in a verdict which they themselves upon cool deliberation would ask to reverse.” 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *391. The practice continued in the American colonies, but fell out of
favor by the nineteenth century. See Courselle, supra note 19, at 217; see also People v. Olcott, 2 Johns.
Cas. 301, 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1801) (“The doctrine of compelling a jury to unanimity, by the pains of
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Under these conditions, it was not surprising that the trial judge would need
to have the power to undo a manifestly unjust verdict.
Counterintuitively, however, the new-trial right may be even more
important in the era of the vanishing trial. We have procedural tools to
eliminate clearly meritless cases early on, and alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms to encourage settlement in the vast majority of remaining
cases.185 This means that for the few cases that do go to trial, the evidence is
unlikely to be completely one sided.186 At the same time, it is also more
likely that there are non-evidentiary issues hampering settlement: perhaps
outrageous or emotionally compelling facts, perhaps significant emotional
investment by one or more of the litigants, or perhaps a widely divergent
estimate between the plaintiff and defendant of the recoverable damages.187
The new-trial right protects against the risk that jurors will be overly
influenced by extralegal considerations.
In most cases, the jury-trial process works very well to arrive at a fairminded and rational result. The high concordance between the judge’s view
of the evidence and the jury’s view certainly evokes confidence in the jury
system as a whole.188 But that same interplay of broad agreement between
judge and jury in the majority of cases suggests that something problematic
might be going on in the 22 percent of cases where judge and jury disagree:
certainly in some cases, it may simply be a matter of “reasonable minds”
differing.189 In other cases, however—that is, the ones where the trial judge
hunger and fatigue, so that the verdict, in fact, be founded not on temperate discussion, and clear
conviction, but on strength of body, is a monstrous doctrine . . . altogether repugnant to a sense of
humanity and justice. A verdict of acquittal or conviction, obtained under such circumstances, can never
receive the sanction of public opinion.”).
185
See Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C.L. REV. 1777, 1810 (2015) (“[T]he
presumptions about a judge’s role have switched from one focused on deciding issues when parties
requested the intervention to one focused on shepherding the case to its end. This end is no longer
presumed to be resolution on the merits and preparation for trial, but is instead presumed to be a nontrial exit.”).
186
This evidence is not likely to be completely balanced; however, there is some evidence that
defendants may be better able to evaluate the merits of the case, resulting in better outcomes for the cases
that fail to settle. See Geraldine Soat Brown, What Happens to Cases That Don’t Settle?, DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Spring 2005, at 25 (noting that of the cases ultimately going to trial, “eight were tried to a jury,
three were tried to a judge; plaintiffs prevailed at trial in three of these cases (one jury trial and two bench
trials) and defendants prevailed in seven trials (six jury trials and one bench trial); one case resulted in a
split verdict”).
187
See Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 31, 41 (1992) (“We have shown how certain emotional responses can increase the number of cases
brought to trial and serve to make the threat of going to trial be a credible one. . . . [A]nger or pride can
lead to a higher frequency of trials . . . .”); Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical
Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 343 (1999) (conducting an
empirical study on settlement and finding that factors discouraging settlement included “the importance
of differences in the parties’ estimations of the likely outcome at trial, the importance of information and
the influence the judge can have on party estimates and strategic behavior”).
188
See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 165.
189
Id.
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is convinced that a “manifest injustice” has been done—it may suggest that
the jury based its conclusion on something other than the evidence put before
it.190
One explanation for this subset of cases is what Professor Luke Meier
has described as the difference between “confidence” and “probability” in
trial evidence.191 In a civil case where the evidence is disputed enough to
avoid summary judgment (that is, there is a genuine question of material fact
for the jury to resolve192), the jury may reasonably and properly decide that
one side’s evidence was stronger than that of the other side.193 But a
reasonable fact finder may also believe, on the same evidence, that the
overall evidence presented at trial is not strong enough to form a confident
belief that the facts presented by the side with the stronger evidence are in
fact true.194 Thus, when the jury is asked to apply the “preponderance of the
evidence” standard to pick a winner, it can do so—but the individual jurors
would not be confident enough in the overall case to be willing to wager
their own money on the result.195 Meier recommends assigning the
“confidence analysis” to the judge and the “probability” analysis to the
jury.196 The judge’s power to review the weight of the evidence is at least in
part just such a confidence analysis—is the evidence as a whole not just
sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to reach the proffered conclusion, but
also strong enough that the judicial system should have confidence in the
conclusion?197
An emphasis on evidentiary weight can also improve decisional
accuracy when the evidence is unbalanced enough that the judge is tempted
to grant summary judgment. Trial judges’ reliance on summary judgment
has grown, even as their power to review evidentiary weight has gone
190
See, e.g., Rohde v. Farmer, 262 N.E.2d 685, 691 (Ohio 1970) (holding that a new trial is
appropriate when “it appears to the trial court that a manifest injustice has been done, and that the verdict
is against the manifest weight of the evidence”).
191
Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the “Reasonable Jury” Standard, 84 MISS. L.J. 747,
749 750 (2015).
192
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (“[T]he trial judge shall then grant
summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c))).
193
See Meier, supra note 191, at 814 16 (discussing the “reasonable jury standard”).
194
Id. at 796 (“Simply put, when the available evidence on a disputed question of fact is too generic,
there can be very little confidence in any probability conclusion drawn from that evidence.”).
195
See Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and Twombly’s Plausibility Standard, 68 SMU L.
REV. 331, 341 (2015) (“[A]lthough George thinks that his probability estimate is accurate based on the
limited information he has considered, he concludes that the amount of information he has considered is
not adequate for the purpose of deciding whether to wager a bet with his friend or not. Before a wager is
placed, additional information is desired . . . .”).
196
Meier, supra note 191, at 814 (“Because the confidence analysis requires a legal or policy
determination, the confidence principle should be assigned to a trial court judge only and not to the
jury.”).
197
See id. (“Because a confidence analysis requires a legal or policy decision as to whether there is
an adequate quantum of evidence in a particular dispute, the judge must make this determination as part
of her analysis of the burden of production.”).
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underused and underappreciated. A recent study of cases in which the
district court granted summary judgment and the appellate court reversed
demonstrated that for at least a small subset of those cases, the jury
ultimately returned a verdict for the non-moving party.199 In these cases, a
focus on evidentiary weight would have avoided the initial error. Because
this discrepancy happened “more frequently in civil rights cases,” review of
evidentiary weight may be especially important to protect litigants’ rights in
this area.200
Finally, the trial judge’s review of evidentiary weight is needed to
protect against wrongful conviction. DNA testing has vividly demonstrated
that innocent people can be convicted.201 The popular media, including
podcasts like Serial and Undisclosed, as well as television shows like
Making a Murderer, have brought national attention to the shortcomings of
the jury-trial process for protecting against wrongful conviction.202 The
appellate system has likewise not been sufficiently protective.203
Encouraging the trial court to exercise review over the strength and weight
of the evidence as a whole (and thus ensuring that the evidence meets the
198

See Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1917 (1998) (calling
summary judgment “a potential juggernaut which, if not carefully monitored, could threaten the relatively
small residue of civil trials that remain”).
199
Michael W. Pfautz, Note, What Would A Reasonable Jury Do? Jury Verdicts Following
Summary Judgment Reversals, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1255, 1287 (2015) (“In these cases, the trial judge
granted summary judgment for the movant, the court of appeals reversed, and the case was tried to a jury
who returned a verdict for the nonmoving party.”).
200
Id. (“These cases prove that judges sometimes err in their determination of what a jury could
reasonably find, and they also suggest that these mistakes occur more frequently in civil rights cases.”).
201
The Innocence Project records 350 convicted individuals who were later exonerated by DNA
evidence, including thirteen people on death row. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/cases/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2017). Including non-DNA reasons for
exoneration brings the numbers to “more than 600 known wrongful convictions since 1973. One hundred
forty of those exonerations involved citizens who had been sentenced to death.” Robert J. Smith,
Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, 87 WASH. L. REV. 139, 142 (2012).
202
See Lisa Kern Griffin, Silence, Confessions, and the New Accuracy Imperative, 65 DUKE L.J.
697, 725–26 n.171 (2016) (“Furthermore, as popular accounts of the incidence, causes, and impact of
wrongful convictions have proliferated, they have also raised broader awareness of the potential for error
. . . . The enormous success of the Serial podcast—which attracted millions of listeners and raised
awareness about potential inaccuracies—exemplifies the emerging concern with reliability.”); see also
Mariam Khan, The Reasons “Serial” Subject Adnan Syed May Receive a New Trial, ABC NEWS (July 7,
2016,
5:00
PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/reasons-serial-subject-adnan-syed-receivetrial/story?id=40373228 (explaining the influence of the Serial podcast, as well as the subsequent
Undisclosed podcast that took a “deeper dive” into the case); Amelia McDonell-Parry, ‘Making a
Murderer’: What Brendan Dassey Decision Means for Steven Avery, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 15, 2016),
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/what-brendan-dassey-decision-means-for-steven-averyw434421 (“[T]here were very few heroes in Making A Murderer’s first season, and not a single one
among the many law enforcement officers who were featured; the police, forensic experts, prosecutors
and, yes, both trial judges earned their fair share of contempt from viewers. Perhaps Judge Duffin was
seizing upon an opportunity to kick off season two on a more positive note—and with better PR.”).
203
See Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 591,
637 (2009) (“The empirical record shows that the American system for appealing criminal convictions
regularly fails in its most important role of protecting against erroneous conviction of the innocent.”).
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requisite confidence level ) can help guard against the conviction of the
innocent.
C. Procedural Due Process and the Right to a New Trial
The protections offered by a robust application of the thirteenth-juror
rule suggest that the trial judge’s power to review the weight of the evidence
fits within the constitutional scheme of procedural due process. It is true that
some federal district courts have held that it is not.205 But the Supreme Court
has certainly not foreclosed the possibility that the trial judge’s review of
evidentiary weight is protected by procedural due process—and, in fact,
some of its early authority suggests that the power to review evidentiary
weight is an essential safeguard of the trial process.206
The Supreme Court’s test for procedural due process requires
conducting “what is in essence a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the risk that
the plaintiff will be erroneously deprived of liberty against the cost of
providing additional procedures to safeguard against such error.”207 On the
cost side, the Supreme Court held that a court must consider “the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.”208 These costs are then weighed against a
litigant’s “private interest that will be affected by the official action,” along
204

See Meier, supra note 191, at 752 (arguing that “the confidence principle is necessarily part of
a judge’s analysis at the summary judgment stage”).
205
See, e.g., Spence v. Sheets, 675 F. Supp. 2d 792, 802 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (“The Due Process Clause
does not provide relief for defendants whose convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence,
but only for those who have been convicted without enough proof to allow a rational trier of fact to find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). This language has been repeated in numerous district court opinions,
most from the northern and southern districts of Ohio. See, e.g., Durdin v. Warden, Mansfield Corr. Inst.,
No. 2:16-CV-355, 2017 WL 1281418, at *13 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 6, 2017), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 2:16-CV-355, 2017 WL 2082927 (S.D. Ohio May 12, 2017); Cole v. Warden, Lebanon
Corr. Inst., No. 2:14-CV-00578, 2016 WL 1625826, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2016), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:14-CV-578, 2016 WL 2961739 (S.D. Ohio May 23, 2016); Billman v.
Warden, Corr. Reception Ctr., No. 2:14-CV-1910, 2016 WL 931262, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2016),
report and recommendation adopted sub nom., Billman v. Warden, Corr. Reception Ctr., No. 2:14-CV01910, 2016 WL 3365407 (S.D. Ohio June 17, 2016), and certificate of appealability denied sub nom.,
DAVID BILLMAN v. CHUVALAS (July 11, 2016); Mathis v. Smith, No. 1:10CV0046, 2011 WL
680148, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:10CV46, 2011 WL
679937 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 16, 2011).
206
See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1899) (“‘Trial by jury,’ in the primary and
usual sense of the term at the common law and in the American constitutions, is not merely a trial by a
jury of twelve men before an officer vested with authority to cause them to be summoned and empaneled,
to administer oaths to them and to the constable in charge, and to enter judgment and issue execution on
their verdict; but it is a trial by a jury of twelve men, in the presence and under the superintendence of a
judge empowered to instruct them on the law and to advise them on the facts, and (except on acquittal of
a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict if in his opinion it is against the law or the evidence.”).
207
Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, 65 EMORY L.J. 1313, 1331
(2016).
208
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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with “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards.”209
Here, the bulk of the costs would be relatively straightforward. They
include the effort that the trial judge puts into reviewing the evidentiary
weight, plus the delay and financial expense caused by the instances in
which the judge orders a new trial on the weight of the evidence. The
litigants’ private interests, of course, are the substantive rights protected by
the judicial system: an interest in liberty and the avoidance of wrongful
imprisonment on the criminal side, and an interest in civil recourse and
corrective justice on the civil side (as well as the avoidance of wrongful
liability). The hard question is in estimating the value of the new trials
resulting from the judge’s ruling—is the value of the new-trial safeguard
high enough to offset its cost?210
This question goes back to the standard applied for new trials—just how
convinced must the judge be that there was a serious miscarriage of
justice?211 If the standard is merely that the judge disagrees with the verdict,
then it is unlikely that the value of a new trial would outweigh its cost. After
all, if it is simply a matter of reasonable minds disagreeing, then the outcome
of the second trial is unlikely to change. But if, on the other hand, the trial
judge is convinced that the evidence weighed strongly against the jury’s
verdict and that the verdict was manifestly unjust, then a new trial is likely
to be much more valuable. It may suggest that the evidence, though legally
sufficient, was not enough to create confidence in the verdict. It may also
suggest that impermissible factors such as juror bias played a role in the
verdict.
Especially when the judge does not know what led the jury to rule as it
did—and this “invisible error” is information the judge typically cannot
know, given the needs of deliberative privacy—the judge should be
encouraged to exercise broad discretion to order a retrial. In order to exercise
this discretion, the trial judge must be able to weigh the evidence as a whole,
re-examining questions of credibility, and viewing the evidence as a neutral
209

Id.
Of course, this analysis is not an either-or equation. As a federal judge and a legal scholar have
noted in regard to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “we are not to choose between quality, speed,
and cost-effectiveness. We are to work toward achieving them all.” Steven S. Gensler & Lee H.
Rosenthal, Measuring the Quality of Judging: It All Adds Up to One, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 475, 492
(2014). In criminal cases, in particular, protecting against wrongful conviction outweighs even
substantial costs. See Matthew Bova, A Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Exception to the New York Appellate
Preservation Rule, 19 CUNY L. REV. 1, 24 (2015) (“Stripped of its underlying justifications, the finality
theory amounts to nothing more than an argument that convicted people should stay convicted.”); DALE
NANCE, THE BURDENS OF PROOF: DISCRIMINATORY POWER, WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, AND TENACITY OF
BELIEF 37 (2016) (explaining the “conventional claim . . . that the disutility of a mistaken conviction is
much larger than the disutility of an erroneous acquittal” and quoting Blackstone’s statement that “the
law holds, that it is better than ten guilty escape, than that one innocent suffer”);
211
See supra Section I.A.
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observer. Of course, the judge’s power is not unlimited. Importantly, most
jurisdictions limit the judge to granting a single new trial on the weight of
the evidence.213 If the judge was right that invisible error infected the
process, then a second jury is unlikely to return the same verdict—given the
safeguards that now exist, it would be highly unusual for the same bias,
misunderstanding, or misconduct to influence a second verdict.214 If a
second jury in fact returns the same verdict that the judge originally thought
weighed strongly against the evidence, then that is a sign that the judge,
rather than the jury, was more likely to have been wrong.215
Perhaps one of the most interesting natural experiments with weight-ofthe-evidence review occurred in Tennessee, which had a long history of
“thirteenth juror” review.216 In 1985, however, the Tennessee Supreme
Court abandoned the practice in criminal cases.217 The Court explained that
it did not see a need for thirteenth-juror review in criminal cases, where the
high standard of proof combined with legal sufficiency review already
seemed to offer protection enough:
The distinction between the “weight” of the evidence and the
“legal sufficiency” of the evidence has little substance in
criminal cases, where the State has the burden of proving the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is difficult to
accept the proposition that a trial judge can reasonably
determine that the evidence is legally sufficient to support a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but that such a
verdict is against the weight of the evidence. We find the
weight of the evidence standard to be difficult, if not
impossible, to apply rationally and uniformly in criminal
cases.218
212

Robertson, supra note 21, at 210 17 (recommending unified standards for judicial review of
evidentiary weight in the federal district courts).
213
Id. at 208 (“If a judge could order new trials consecutively until a jury returns a verdict with
which the judge can agree, then it is true that the verdict is effectively rendered by the judge instead of
the jury.”); see also Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Webber, 841 F.2d 1245, 1249 51 (4th Cir. 1988)
(concluding that judicial policy disfavors “multiple retrials” in the absence of “‘exceptional’
circumstances”).
214
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (discussing how the right to an “unimpaired
jury” is protected by voir dire; juror observation “by the court, by counsel, and by court personnel”;
jurors’ ability to “report inappropriate juror behavior to the court before they render a verdict”; and postverdict impeachment “by nonjuror evidence of misconduct”).
215
Robertson, supra note 21, at 208 09 (“There is a general presumption that if a second jury agrees
with the first, it was the trial judge and not the jury who was mistaken about the weight of the evidence.”).
216
State v. Johnson, 692 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn. 1985) (Drowota, J., dissenting) (“Under
Tennessee law, the thirteenth juror rule was long seen as the best safeguard against jury error.”).
217
The Tennessee Court had earlier concluded that such review was not required by the United
States Constitution. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Tenn. 1978). In Johnson, the court ruled
that it “should not be reinstated as a part of Tennessee criminal procedure.” 692 S.W.2d. at 413 14.
218
Johnson, 692 S.W.2d. at 413.
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Two of the justices on the court joined a dissenting opinion, warning that the
court overlooked important protections offered by the thirteenth-juror
power.219 The dissent noted that review for evidentiary weight included
attention to witness credibility and demeanor, and argued that it “may be the
only safeguard available against a miscarriage of justice by the jury.”220
It took only six years for the Tennessee Supreme Court to reverse course
and adopt a formal rule reinstating the trial judge’s ability to review the
weight of the evidence.221 An advisory committee charged with studying the
issue had recommended the rule change.222 In 2015, the court acknowledged
the safeguards offered by the rule, quoted the earlier dissent with approval
and even added its own emphasis, adopting the former dissent’s argument
that the new-trial right performed an important role in safeguarding “against
a miscarriage of justice by the jury.”223
Thus, although courts may express concern that granting a new trial on
the weight of the evidence may “usurp” the jury’s role224 in fact finding, the
judge is actually playing a very different role. The judge is not acting as a
super-juror, or even as a true “thirteenth juror,” even though the judge may
be making a similar determination about the credibility of witnesses and the
overall weight of the evidence. Instead, the judge and jury are both given the
opportunity to exercise their complementary strengths: for the jury, this is
the power of group decision-making, the greater diversity of its members,
and a more accurate reflection of the community.225 The judge, on the other
hand, has greater experience with a range of cases and an understanding of
how the facts and the law interrelate in the case, giving the judge an intuitive
sense of when the jury might have misunderstood the court’s instructions
even when the judge cannot directly inquire into the basis of the jury’s
decision. Weight-of-the-evidence review protects both of these
complementary roles: the jury is given the independence to allow full, free,
and confidential deliberation, while the judge is permitted to exercise the
discretion gained from experience to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

219

Id. at 414 15 (Drowota J., dissenting).
Id. at 415.
221
State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119, 121–22 (Tenn. 1995).
222
Id.
223
State v. Ellis, 453 S.W.3d 889, 899 (Tenn. 2015) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Johnson,
692 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn. 1985) (Drowota, J., dissenting)).
224
See, e.g., Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1047 (6th Cir. 1996) (cautioning that when
a trial judge decides to grant a new trial on the weight of the evidence without a finding that the jury
process was tainted by an “undesirable or pernicious element,” the judge thereby “effects a denigration
of the jury system” and potentially “usurp[s]” the jury’s role).
225
See Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179,
216 (1998) (“Jury determination of the amount of punitive damages also might be deemed preferable
because a jury’s verdict reflects the judgment of all the jurors, whereas a judge’s determination is the
judgment of one man or woman.”).
220
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CONCLUSION
The trial judge’s authority to order a new trial on the weight of the
evidence is an important, though underappreciated, aspect of the right to a
jury trial. The power to grant a new trial acts as a safeguard against invisible
error—that is, error that arises from improper jury decision-making that
hides behind the shroud of deliberative secrecy. Invisible error can be caused
by the jury’s innocent misunderstanding or by more egregious juror
misconduct or undisclosed bias. But in either case, the attorneys and the
court see only the result of the jury’s decision-making, not the erroneous
procedure that led to that result.
The possibility of such error, however, is no reason to jettison the jury
altogether. The jury has strengths that cannot be matched by judges alone,
including the power of group decision-making, a greater diversity in its
members, and a more accurate reflection of the community. Nor should the
judiciary eliminate the jury’s right to deliberate in secrecy. The jury process
and the power of deliberation work only when jurors are afforded the privacy
and independence to fully air all points of view, free from harassment or
scrutiny.
Instead, courts should recognize review of evidentiary weight as part of
the constitutional guarantee of due process. This view plays to the traditional
strengths of the judicial role: that is, a greater experience with a range of
cases and a better understanding of how the facts and the law interrelate in
the case. Even when the judge cannot identify a particular process error, the
judge may have an intuitive sense that a jury has gone astray. The judge’s
power to review the weight of the evidence thus complements the jury’s role
and protects the integrity of the trial process. The jury is given the
independence to allow full, free, and confidential deliberation, while the
judge is permitted to exercise the discretion gained from experience to
prevent a miscarriage of justice. Even in the era of the endangered jury and
vanishing trial, judges should embrace the power to order a new trial when
justice demands it.

